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Smallholder Irrigation Schemes (SISs) in South Africa have reported below expectation 
performance, despite massive investments. A diagnosis of the SISs poor performance indicates 
prevalence of infrastructural deficiencies, as well as poor institutional setup. The government’s 
Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) initiative compounds the problem. IMT placed irrigators 
in self-governance, which inadvertently made irrigators carry the burden of scheme Operation and 
Maintenance (O&M) costs. This study sought to investigate and evaluate how technical design 
principles i.e., technical aspect of irrigation design, interact with irrigation water governance for 
SISs in KwaZulu-Natal Province. The study hypothesized that the existing current water control 
infrastructure does relate to the water governance frameworks in the selected study sites. The study 
was carried out in Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme (TFIS) and Mooi-River Irrigation Scheme 
(MRIS). An infrastructure condition assessment was carried out followed by a root cause analysis. 
Questionnaires were then administered to relevant stakeholders to rate the degree of identified 
causal factors. Key informants ranked how water governance and infrastructure aspects are related. 
The data was processed using a fuzzy theory approach. Finally, structured questionnaires were 
administered to irrigators to establish how water governance impacted on water adequacy for crop 
production. A binary logit regression model was employed to process the data. Assessments 
revealed the poor condition of the infrastructure, such as deep cracks in canals and missing latches 
on hydrants. The study revealed that TFIS had a strong institutional setups according to the 
Closeness Coefficients(𝐶𝐶𝑖 = 0.18), and clearly defined goals and objectives for the scheme 
operation. However, other governance aspects such as procedures (𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑆 = 0.17, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐼𝑆 =
0.16) were not strong. MRIS (𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐼𝑆 = 0.20) had a good standing on rules and regulations as 
compared to TFIS (𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑆 = 0.14). Eight water governance related statistically significant 
variables that influenced water adequacy were identified. The eight variables were irrigation 
scheme (𝑝 = 0.000), location of plot within the scheme (𝑝 = 0.008), training in water 
management (𝑝 = 0.012), satisfaction with irrigation schedule (𝑝 = 0.000), irrigation training 
(𝑝 = 0.085), farmer knowledge of governments aims in SIS (𝑝 = 0.012), availability of water 
licenses (𝑝 = 0.002),  and water fees (𝑝 = 0.022). A descriptive analysis showed that 24% and 
86% of the farmers in MRIS and TFIS respectively, had adequate water. The study concluded that 
the SISs lacked an O&M plan and the farmers were not willing to opt for collective action and 
iii 
 
cooperate in Water Users Association (WUAs) and Irrigation Management Committees (IMCs). 
Some of the water governance aspects were discordant with infrastructure characteristics and 
requirements, consequently, impacting on the water adequacy for the irrigators. Overall, the study 
proved the hypothesis that the water control infrastructure does not relate with the water 
governance framework. This study recommends that the stakeholders involved in SISs, i.e., 
government, extension workers, NGOs, should aid the irrigators in policy articulation. In addition, 
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Irrigation remains the key driver for agricultural productivity and increased food security (Hayami 
& Kikuchi, 1978; Van Koppen, 1998). Smallholder farming in South Africa is described as the 
best vehicle to mitigate poverty (Machethe, 2004). Smallholder irrigation schemes (SISs) are 
defined as a group of farmers collectively sharing and managing Common Pool Resources (CPRs) 
such as water and irrigation infrastructure (Van Averbeke et al., 2011). The CPRs are treated, as 
common property, as such, there is complex interactions amongst physical, technical and socio-
economic factors that dictate scheme dynamics (Javaid & Falk, 2015; Abel et al., 2016). In order 
to boost productivity governments and non-governmental agencies have devoted financial, 
organisational and technical investments in construction and rehabilitation of the infrastructure in 
SISs. Tortajada (2016) asserts that built infrastructure is pivotal in attaining a correct irrigation 
function as evidenced by the Asian green revolution whose success is attributed to improved 
irrigation infrastructure (Machethe, 2004), coupled with plant breeding and marketing support 
policies. 
 
To minimise expenditure and liability, government adopted Irrigation Management Transfer 
(IMT). The government’s IMT facilitated the hand-over take-over of scheme affairs from 
government to irrigators. IMT facilitated the creation of institutions such as Water Users 
Association (WUAs) and Irrigation Management Committees (IMCs), which are, by definition 
legal entities that are primarily concerned with Operation and Maintenance (O&M) of the 
irrigation scheme infrastructure and water governance (Samad, 2002). Water governance in this 
document is defined as institutions, processes, procedures, rules and regulations involved in water 
management as shown in Figure 1.1. Effective water governance in irrigation schemes entails the 
design of policies and institutional frameworks that are congruent with the physical, technical and 














Figure 1.1  The water governance nexus linking institutions, processes, procedures, rules 
and regulations 
 
Sustainability in irrigation schemes is brought about through reconciling the physical and technical 
attributes of the irrigation scheme and the irrigators characteristics in terms of their socioeconomic 
status (Marothia, 2002). In South Africa the IMT process transferred an infrastructure 
incompatible with the local management capabilities (Vermillion, 1997). 
 
1.1 Typical SISs Infrastructure  
 
Sambo (2015) argued that there is no gold standard in defining water infrastructure used by rural 
farmers. However, Hunter et al. (2009) cited by Sambo (2015) based their definition on population 
size, whereas Senzanje et al. (2012) based the definition on scale and use. Senzanje et al. (2012) 
defined smallholder water infrastructure as “any technical hardware that is used by rural farmers 
or communities in capturing, collecting, controlling, using, managing and disposing of water” 
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Figure 1.2  Typical SISs infrastructure: (a) Sluice gate for controlling the flow of water, 
(b) A diesel pump abstracting water from Thukela river, (c) Concrete lined 
canal conveying water to plots and (d) A hydrant and a canvas hose 
 
Marothia (2002) proposed a framework of interacting physical-technical and socioeconomic 
attributes that are at play in irrigation scheme dynamics (Figure 1.3). These attributes more often 
than not combine in a configurational manner i.e., to understand the effect of one attribute on has 
to be aware of what other attributes are also in effect. In SISs, a disruption in one attribute or CPR 





















Figure 1.3  Conceptual framework for analysing SISs under IMT (after Marothia, 2002) 
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Following IMT, Horst (1998) pointed that the irrigators inherited irrigation infrastructure that were 
built and rehabilitated by designers from different irrigation schools (Dutch, British, American). 
This rendered the infrastructure to be out of sync with the socio-economic local dynamics of SISs 
and subsequently affected the irrigators’ capability to understand and operate the hydraulic 
infrastructure. Consequently, the water governance structures in SISs are formulated to a pre-
existing technology (infrastructure) which subsequently offsets the equilibrium between the O&M 
of the technical aspects and the socio-economic dynamics (human dimension). 
 
The research questions for this study were: 
i. Does governance affect infrastructure handling and its condition? 
ii. What are the effects of water governance on SISs understanding of infrastructure 
characteristics and its functional and operational requirements? 
iii. How does water governance affect adequacy of water for cropping requirements in SISs? 
 
The research aim for this study was to investigate and evaluate how technical design principles 
(technical aspect of irrigation design) interact with irrigation governance for SISs in KwaZulu-
Natal Province. This study integrated a wide spectrum of research aspects from engineering to 
partly socio-institutional factors. The specific objectives were to: 
 
i. Investigate and evaluate the water control infrastructure in selected SISs in KwaZulu-
Natal. 
ii. Assess the functional and operational relationships between the water control infrastructure 
and water governance in the study irrigation schemes. 
iii. Evaluate the impact of water governance on adequacy of water for crop production in 
selected SISs in KwaZulu-Natal. 
The hypotheses for the specific objectives were: 
i. The existing infrastructure is sound and resilient, i.e., it serves the purpose. 





iii. The governance arrangements in place have a significant effect on water adequacy and its 
availability to the farmers. 
 
1.2 Outline of Dissertation Structure 
 
This dissertation is organised into six chapters. 
Chapter 1 Provides a general overview of the study detailing its justification and the 
objectives. 
Chapter 2 Details a holistic outlook on Smallholder irrigation schemes (SISs) in South Africa. 
It reviews literature on SISs characteristics, government policy and objectives for 
the SISs. It discusses the irrigation management transfer (IMT) initiative and how 
it has impacted SISs performance. The chapter lastly discusses policies that hinder 
performance of the SISs. 
Chapter 3 Investigates and analyses the condition of the existing water control infrastructure 
in the selected irrigation schemes. 
Chapter 4 Focuses on assessing the functional and operational relationship between water 
governance and the existing water control infrastructure. 
Chapter 5 Assesses how water governance impacted adequacy of water for crop production 
and other uses in SISs. 
Chapter 6 This contains the summary, conclusions and recommendations chapter of this 
study. It highlights the major findings of this work and makes recommendations 
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Attaining food security status for the budding global population has always been an issue that takes 
priority on the global stage. Irrigation is pivotal in reducing world poverty by maximising 
production, boosting employment opportunities which subsequently leads to income stabilization 
and finally it facilitates the attainment of a positive nutritional status, health and societal equity 
(Mati, 2011; Valipour, 2015). Research has shown that irrigation has the potential to increase 
yields of most crops by between 100 and 400 % and by the year 2046 it is expected that 70% of 
grain will be produced from the world’s irrigable land (Rockström et al., 2009). Nearly half of the 
world’s arable lands (46%), are not suitable for rain-fed agriculture due to unpredictable and 
accelerated climatic changes and the respective prevailing environmental conditions. 
 
Previous studies have produced empirical evidence that indicated a relationship between irrigation 
and the Human Development Index (HDI). HDI constitutes development indicators such as 
environment, energy, food and population and determining their relations is imperative because 
collectively they combat food insecurity and poverty (Inocencio, 2007; Franks et al., 2008; Khan 
et al., 2009; Mati, 2011; Burney et al., 2013; Ngenoh et al., 2015). 
 
Agriculture, through irrigation, is the biggest water consumer in South Africa and prudently a 
water management policy must be implemented to limit the agricultural water demand. The vast 
majority of South Africa’s Agro-ecological regions (60%), receive less than 500 mm of rain per 
annum and only 10% receives 750 mm. This inherently limits the country’s agricultural potential 
(Cousins, 2013). The South African government needs to meet the MDGs (Millennium 
Development Goals) turned SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) of employment creation and 
poverty reduction, predominantly among rural African population. As a consequence of the 
skyrocketing unemployment levels and trying to fulfil its mandate of creating five million jobs by 




huge fraction of these jobs, 300,000 are to be created from the establishment and revitalization of 
smallholder irrigation schemes (SISs) (NGP, 2011). 
 
2.2 Smallholder Agriculture: A Historical Perspective 
 
The pre- 1994 Segregationist policies that reigned over South Africa caused a disturbance in 
traditional agricultural practices. These restrictive polices resulted in limiting the amount of land 
the native Africans could own to about 13% of the total arable land in 1994 (Nieuwoudt & 
Groenewald, 2003). From their advent in 1913, the homelands typified high populations per square 
kilometre, small hectarage allotments of arable land and shared grazing land. The rangeland 
availed to communities were insufficient for supporting livestock (Van Averbeke, 2012) given that 
livestock has always played an important role in African homesteads. It facilitates multi uses 
through providing draught power, nutrition (milk, and meat) and social needs like traditional 
ceremonies (Mills & Wilson, 1952; Van Averbeke, 2012). 
 
The Tomlinson Commission (Tomlinson, 1955) revealed that small-holder farmers that registered 
a significant development in key dimensions of household income, sending children to school and 
considerable health were those that were living on existing irrigation schemes of 1.28 ha in size 
and had enough access to grazing lands. The Tomlinson Commission (Tomlinson, 1955) aimed to 
promote economic viability of rural farm units. However, it was never implemented.  
 
2.3 African Smallholder Irrigation Schemes and Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) 
 
The size of allotments defined the course of agricultural practices of the African smallholder 
farmers. The established smallholder lots varied from 5 ha – 12 ha of lands. Van Averbeke et al. 
(2011) reported that the subsistence farming model was set in motion by providing a large 
population of African homesteads with access to farm land (plots) which ranged from 0.1 ha – 0.3 
ha in size. Post-apartheid South Africa saw a lot of provincial governments dismantling the 
agricultural homeland parastatals and allowing direct farmer involvement in the irrigation scheme 
management. This saw the decentralisation of the management of the schemes. Simultaneously a 





IMT was to be a vehicle that would facilitate the reduction of civic disbursement on irrigation, 
enhancing productivity of irrigation and stabilizing the management of irrigation systems 
(Vermillion, 1997). The advent of IMT had a negative effect on parastatal controlled projects and 
the disturbance was predominant on the large turned small scale irrigation schemes because of the 
complexity in their management. Centralised management caused a high-level dependency on 
external management amongst the small-holder farmers (Van Averbeke et al., 1998). 
 
Bembridge & Sebotja (1992) and Laker (2004) reported that with the implementation of IMT, a 
regressive effect was experienced on these schemes. Canal schemes at small-holder level 
withstood the effects and operated at moderated levels (Kamara et al., 2002; Machethe et al., 
2004). With IMT, already on the roll out in the 1990’s, there also emerged several new SISs, which 
were part of to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The agenda targeted 
poverty alleviation and improving the human development index among poor rural population and 
those that occupied the informal urban settlements. A total number of 62 SISs were instituted in 
2006 and they covered a total land area of 2,383 ha. This, however, showed that size was limited 
to approximately 38.4 ha per scheme on average. According to Denison & Manona (2007), the 
means of water abstraction and application were pumps and sprinkler technology. 
 
Policy revision saw Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) superseding the RDP as the 
overall development policy of South Africa. The plan redefined poverty eradication by funding 
community-based projects to privatising development. Already established irrigation schemes 
were the earmarked drivers of the gradual economic absorptive capacity of the rural areas. 
However, for the schemes to realise improved efficiency, revitalization was required first. Thus 
the Revitalization of Small-holder Irrigation Schemes (RESIS) was initiated (Denison & Manona, 
2007). 
 
The Water Care Programme was the vehicle for RESIS and it targeted the revitalization of 
identified small-holder irrigation schemes. The programme was not limited to infrastructure but 
extended to capacity building of leadership, management and productivity. A multi-pronged and 




rural people in the planning and management of development projects and programmes (Denison 
& Manona, 2007). 
 
To show dedicated furtherance of IMT, Water Care invested one-third of its budget into 
revitalization and capacity building among farmers. Shah et al. (2002a) states that procedures for 
sustainable revitalization and capacity development were put in place for the small-holder farmers 
and their subsequent schemes. Rehabilitation of existing scheme infrastructure, sustainable IMT 
and substantial commercialization were the chief accents of the Water Care programme and RESIS 
in its initial stages (1998-2005). Schemes that used canals for water conveyance before and after 
the revitalization phase remained canal schemes. 
 
2.4 Smallholder Irrigation Schemes Performance in South Africa 
 
South Africa’s irrigation sector has evolved into a stable physical and administrative system. The 
evolution can be attributed to transitions in social and administrative sectors, i.e., transitions, from 
empires to colonial systems, from shared water resources to a self-regulating network of reservoirs 
and connected waterways or channels (Bandaragoda & Firdousi, 1992). In addition,  Bandaragoda 
& Firdousi (1992), assert that the long experience has seen the evolution of stable and sustainable 
irrigation traditions that have supported the diverse community appeal in the schemes. This 
subsequently resulted in an intricate institutional milieu in which a set of legally established 
irrigation rules and organizations existed side by side with an intricate set of unsanctioned social 
institutions (Abemethy, 1993). This resulted in a dual system that was discordant in which erratic 
changes developed that disturbed the composite physical system, and a multifaceted, but relatively 
inharmonious institutional framework. 
 
Bandaragoda & Firdousi (1992) pointed out the complex multifaceted characteristics of the South 
African irrigation situation, with allocation of resources by government, irrigation management at 
provincial level, large centralized institutions, a sundry of water users with slim or zero 
involvement in irrigation management decisions, difficult coordination among agencies and their 
sub-units and functions, numerous laws and procedures mixed with traditional concepts and erratic 




countervailing forces that acted against formal rules. The dominant features, however, appear to 
be the discordancy between the outdated institutional framework and the emerging new 
requirements of irrigation management, on the one hand, and the general ineptness of most of the 
formally established institutions in view of strong socially evolved institutions, on the other 
(Abemethy, 1993). Nevertheless, low agricultural yields from small-holder irrigation schemes 
downplay the invested efforts to achieve stability through enhanced physical infrastructure and 
technological inputs, all in a bid to improve performance and, hence yields are an important 
performance indicator of revitalized schemes (Bandaragoda & Firdousi, 1992). According to 
Bandaragoda & Firdousi (1992), the predominant institutional factors, which impacted negatively 
on irrigation performance in South Africa, are acknowledged as: 
 discordancy between infrastructure and the social setting i.e.; infrastructure is not mirroring 
the societal set-up, and 
 the obsolescence of irrigation rules, codes and procedures. 
 
Bandaragoda & Firdousi (1992) further stated that changes in irrigation rules and organizational 
structures have not matched the fast-paced developments in other facets of irrigation in the form 
of resource base and technology, and in social demand. Manpower and financial resource levels 
in irrigation agencies have declined (Abemethy, 1993), while the subsequent workloads have 
intensified many folds. Similarly, established data collection and processing procedures cannot 
augment the need for more information. Slow developments and progress have been compounded 
by redundant formal rules and inappropriate infrastructure. 
 
2.5 Governments Intervention and Action Plans in Smallholder Irrigation Schemes 
2.5.1 Emerging policy issues and strategy formulation 
 
Policy makers have been gradually acknowledging the part smallholder irrigation farming plays 
in improving better rural livelihoods. This has subsequently prompted South Africa to incentivize 
the process of construction and revitalizing irrigation infrastructure. Water allocation and 
appropriate management of common pool resources (CPRs) are the most prevalent problems in 
communally managed irrigation schemes. These problems stem from a failure to understand the 




such circumstances (Muchara, 2014). The National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS 2) is based 
on the current National Water Act (NWA) of 1998. However, while reviewing the NWRS1, it 
became clear that there are several emerging policy issues that could not be included as strategies 
in the NWRS2 as the current legislation does not make provision for these. The NWRS outlines 
the need to eliminate poverty through improved water equity and water supports developments. 
The developments can be contextualized as infrastructure developments, WUAs and IMCs 
support. These developments are water governance related. 
 
2.5.2 Institutional arrangements 
 
The KwaZulu-Natal Department of Agriculture and Rural Development presented its five-year 
plan for the period 2015-2020 (DARD, 2015). The blue print marked a five-year plan for policy 
and strategies that interact with the smallholder farmers for improved rural economies. This five-
year year plan (2015-2020) set out goals that are parallel with the New Growth Path (NGP) of 
eliminating poverty and attaining food security at rural level through the construction and 
resuscitation of existing irrigation schemes. The construction was aligned with societal set-up that 
has informally evolved, thus promoting a synergy between the water control infrastructure and the 
water governance section for maximized agricultural production (DARD, 2015) 
 
The NGP which is an accelerator to rapid economic growth has earmarked agriculture which 
contributes significantly to the GDP as one of the key targets to the attainment of the SDG’s. Thus, 
strategies have been lined up to boost SISs (DARD, 2015). The NGP stipulates that the government 
agricultural policy focuses on restructuring institutions and procedures that are involved in water 
resource management at identified SISs so that they align with the existing infrastructure and avail 
comprehensive support around infrastructure upgrade and revitalisation. 
Medium term strategic framework (MTSF) 2015-2020 
The government in its pursuit of strategic configuration and policy consistency has resolved to use 
the 2015-2020 Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) as lustrum phase for implementing 
the National Development Plan (NDP). The NDP targets infrastructure development in South 




revatilisation. The NDP is a vehicle for accelerated agrarian transformation in the SISs which were 
previous poverty nodes during apartheid. 
Agrarian transformation strategy 
 
Agrarian transformation strategy is a holistic programme that is founded on several interventions 
ranging from the provision of basic services and social amenities for rural communities, food 
security support, and interventions in crop production. Increased crop production is facilitated by 
a functional irrigation scheme (KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government, 2012). This strategy aims 
at again revitalising the irrigation schemes. The revitalization will focus on modern upgrades that 
will be consistent with the evolving informal governance institutions and procedures (KwaZulu-
Natal Provincial Government, 2012). 
 
2.6 Water Access and Water Security 
 
Variations in the level of water access are experienced in community-managed schemes. The 
greatest challenges are the deficiency of interaction between institutions and functionality and the 
operability of the water control structures. This subsequently influences the understanding of water 
security issues and local management systems (WUAs) (Muchara, 2014). The performance of 
irrigation schemes is influenced by a sundry of factors. The level of understanding of the scheme 
design and operability influences the individual in charge of water appropriation and it plays a 
critical role in equitable distribution. Farms are grouped into lots which are further sub-divided 
into smaller units, where each subdivision comes with an overlooking authority who manages and 
operates the infrastructure. The smallest indivisible sub-group of water users has little or no say 
when it comes to implementing water use and appropriation strategies as they are normally 
represented by an authority slightly above them in the hierarchy. This setup can be best be 






Figure 2.1  Conceptual hierarchal set-up on water distribution and water management at 
each level 
 
The main canal has a manager and a user’s committee that comprise of irrigators. The hierarchal 
arrangement ensures that the overseeing authority at the main canal adheres to the rules and 
regulations as per the prescribed water budget from Department of Water and Sanitations 
(DWAS). However, this setting has proved to be ineffective as it is constantly disturbed by politics 
i.e., offtake managers that have access to, and close ties, with main canal operator will get 
favourable allocation. Mbatha & Antrobus (2008) applied the Physical Externalities (PE) model 
to evaluate irrigation water distribution challenges among farmers along the Kat River Valley in 
South Africa. The geographical location of farmers along a given watercourse, in which water is 
diverted by individuals, leads to structural inefficiencies that unconstructively affect the whole 
farming community, with more significant effects felt at downstream sites than upstream (Mbatha 
& Antrobus, 2008; Muchara et al., 2014). 
 
Poor coordination and non-compliance with institutional and regulatory instruments lead to such 
water allocation inefficiencies. Continuous assessment of irrigation governance institutions in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), is critical given the transfer from the state-driven management regimes 
towards community-based management regimes (Dorward & Omamo, 2009). The paradigm shift 
in irrigation management has been to a greater part been influenced by the IMT and Participatory 
Irrigation Management (PIM) approaches within the water sector (Perret & Geyser, 2007; Gomo 
et al., 2014). As such, several frameworks borrowed from ecological, sociological, political and 
economics schools have been implemented to assess institutional performance. In several 








convolution of the institutions and the need to streamline the focus of the analysis to local water 
management issues, some studies by Alt & Shepsle (1990) and Dorward et al. (2009) applied the 
Institutional Development Analysis (IDA) approach to investigate and analyse a possible 
combination of institutions, social structure, rules and regulations that can be merged to provide a 
correct irrigation function for farmers. 
 
2.7 Farmer Participation: Development of Water User Associations (WUAs) 
 
The past five years has seen smallholder irrigation development going through drastic change. The 
dynamics have seen the government agricultural parastatals assuming the role of developing and 
handling irrigation systems and has paved the way for water user participation which has 
subsequently seen the creation of farmer organizations. Frederick (1993) described the change and 
the new methodologies being implemented in this sector as focused on the demand-led 
development of water services and decentralized management. 
 
The centralized methodology to water resource management has proven to be unsustainable 
because it has neglected incentives for users to participate in system funding and management and 
to provide services based on user affordability (Hamdy & Lacirignola, 1997). Poorly adapted 
services created problems including users' refusal to pay for services, public institutions 
complaining about the lack of ownership by farmers and residents, operation and maintenance are 
ignored, and costly infrastructure begins to deteriorate prematurely. Typically, Water User’s 
Associations (WUAs) can be categorised as shown in Figure 2.2 where, each category represent 
the levels involved in catchment and canal management. Sun & Fu (2016) argued that despite 
enormous government spending in infrastructure upgrades there still exists a plethora of challenges 
that are analogous to irrigation water management at farm level for which both structural and non-
structural (Governance is the critical non-structural measure) measures are not addressing. Figure 
2.2 shows the administrative structure involved in SISs. 
The DWAS is the overall water resources basin planner/regulator. The irrigation district 
management has a dual role of water planning/regulating and operations. Their roles extend to 
construction of water control infrastructure, planning, operation and management of irrigation. 




scheme. Sub-fam level prefecture reports to the farm level authorities and they indulge in canal 
maintenance. At the village level and below are field canals and ditches, which are maintained by 
the farmers who own or occupy leased land. They handle on farm water management under the 




             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
            
 
Figure 2.2  The hierarchal nature of the WUAs (Yang et al., 2003) 
 
Although water resource management was introduced to promote harmony between water users 
and the improved technology, there are often always conflicts and misallocations. Common Pool 
Resources (CPRs) usage is heterogeneous, hence water requirements vary across the scheme. As 
a consequence, there is conflict amongst water controlling agencies at each level shown in Figure 
2.2 (Yang et al., 2003). 
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The non-cohesiveness can be attributed to the technology adoption capacity at each water 
governing body along the hierarchy. The top water users association (WUAs) and irrigation 
management committees (IMCs) tend to be well versed in the technology and the bottom level 
(village level) is rocked with design assumptions whereby the technology implemented tends to 
cater for the top management level with little or no consideration of the bottom level water 
governing institutions (Horst, 1998). The operational reality and the design assumption tend to be 
in parallels and the management staff at the various level of the system "inherit" systems with 
hydraulic defects which are incompatible with the staff capabilities and hardly understood by 
farmers (Horst, 1998). 
 
2.8 Policies Hindering the Performance from a Technical Perspective 
 
The systematized observation, documentation and interpretation of irrigation scheme management 
and operations are classified as scheme performance evaluation (Mengü & Akkuzu, 2009). 
Performance evaluation is done so as to check that the input of resources, operational schedules, 
intended outputs and required actions proceed as planned (Bos et al., 2005). Irrigation scheme 
assessment is done so as to gauge progress against strategic goals, evaluate the condition of the 
scheme, to measure the impacts of interventions, to improve scheme operations, to better 
understand determinants of performance, and finally it is a fundamental process of analysing 
performance-oriented management (Molden et al., 1998; Awulachew & Ayana, 2011). 
 
Malano et al. (2004) defined benchmarking in irrigation as “as a useful tool for continuous 
improvement, it infers on upgrading all aspects of service delivery and resource utilization by 
comparison with other schemes”. However, benchmarking is a change process that goes beyond 
comparison. Diagnosis of irrigation performance fundamentally must absorb the multi-pronged 
characteristics of irrigated agricultural systems including institutional setups, resources used, 
services delivered and agricultural outputs.  
 
Irrigation performance indicators have been compartmentalized into internal and external 
indicators that best describe the afore-mentioned irrigation agriculture characteristics. Internal 




further broken down into the following modules: operational procedures of the systems, 
institutional setups for management, irrigation infrastructure, and water delivery services. Internal 
indicators facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the processes that effect water delivery 
service and the overall performance of a system (Facon et al., 2008). Hence, they are informative 
in showing what would have to be done to improve the internal and hence the external 
performance. 
 
External indicators primarily focus on input and output evaluation to and from irrigation schemes, 
which narrow down to the efficiency of the inputs, i.e., resource base (land, water, finance) in 
irrigated agriculture. External indicators can be best employed as part of a strategic performance 
assessment and benchmarking performance of schemes (Burt & Styles, 2004). Molden et al. 
(2014) mentioned in as much as policies, institutions (both formal and informal), procedures and 
regulations are critical in defining pliability of a scheme; effective understanding of infrastructure 
is critical. 
 
2.8.1 Hydraulic water delivery performance in irrigation schemes 
 
The ideal irrigation design meets all the requirements of conveyance and application efficiencies. 
However, due to engineering and water governance reasons the irrigation system more often than 
not does not meet the design objective. Water governance in this section means the institutions 
and procedures that are involved in water management, hydraulic performance refers to the 
adequacy of conveyance, distribution, and delivery of irrigation water in spatial and temporal 
scales. There is an established criterion used for hydraulic performance measurement which 
incorporates factors like adequacy, operational efficiency, equity, reliability, timeliness, delivery 
performance ratio (Molden et al., 1998; Tariq et al., 2004; Unal et al., 2004; Vos, 2005). 
 
Many SISs are gravity operated and poor hydraulic performance is a constant in hindering 
maximum productivity of the design system. The poor performance is attributed to the incongruous 
relationship between designs, i.e. the hydraulic perturbations, and design sensitivity vis-à-vis the 
operational procedures as set out by the established water management institutions, i.e. WUAs and 




effects of operational decisions are key to effective canal control (Renault, 2000b). Chancellor 
(2000) pointed out that the long-term sustainability of SISs is chiefly reliant on design suitability 
of the scheme. However, the present designs were/are driven by crop water requirements and the 
type of soils in the respective region. A great number of irrigation schemes in South Africa were 
planned and developed using design assumptions without consulting with farmers. This has led to 
a persistent inconsistency of design assumption and operational reality has been prevalent in all 
the modern-day schemes across the KwaZulu-Natal region (Fanadzo, 2012); cited by (Phakathi, 
2016). The Makhantini Flats Irrigation Scheme design in KwaZulu-Natal has resulted in a lot of 
conflict amongst water users as the design delivers large volumes of water to about 100 ha or more 
on a fixed irrigation cycle of 7 days. There are 10 ha allotments/plots, which meant to maintain 
frugality in water delivery each lot had to synchronize their water delivery schedules and they 
should plant crops with the same water requirements (A'Bear & Louw, 1994). 
 
Lack of the required technical knowledge of water manager at smallholder scheme level has greatly 
affected the potential and benefits that should be derived from the schemes. Water conflicts 
amongst head, middle, and tail ends of the scheme have been the end result of ineffectual water 
appropriation to the various tertiary units (Dejen, 2015). The set out operational procedures tend 
to deliver water in excess in some parts of the scheme. In addition, illegal water abstractions and 
unauthorized infrastructure handling subsequently cause a deficit to other parts. 
 
The other impact of the discordancy between system design and operational procedures is the 
reduced efficiency of the system due to losses in conveyance and application. Due to over-
application there tends to be runoff losses at the tail ends. This signifies the low water 
productivities involved in the SISs that subsequently lead to reduced downstream availability of 
the available water resources for irrigation. Environmental issues have also been noted in poorly 
run schemes. Many cases of water logging and salinization have been observed, especially in 







2.8.2 Canal operation 
 
The principle of canal operation is typically a complex procedure that has inputs, processing, and 
outputs. Figure 2.3 depicts an irrigation scheme nexus composed of hydraulic structures, water 
users, institutions and processes. The whole process leading to water discharge requires each 









Figure 2.3  The principle of Input-Output in a hydraulic structure (Renault, 2008) 
 
The operation can best be described as sensitive. Sensitivity is a reaction to external stimuli 
(Dictionary, 1991). The output is a function of the actions of the water users and the institutions 
and processes that are effected on the hydraulic structures (Renault, 2008). For maximum 
effectiveness, there should be a thorough knowledge of the relationship between the inputs and the 
outputs. Due to the complexity of the canal system, which arises from their interactive operation 
and hydraulic behaviour, it poses a problem whereby operators fail to comprehend the operability 
and functionality of the system (Horst, 1998; Dejen, 2015). 
 
System design determines irrigation performance.  There are chiefly two design principles used 
during irrigation system design and these are bifurcating systems and hierarchical systems. The 
bifurcating systems divides water among two or three large groups of farmers which is subdivided 
again into two to three smaller groups. The hierarchical system is mostly adopted in modern 
















smaller (tertiary) units. Van Averbeke et al. (2011) stated that weak institutional and organizational 
arrangement hinder effective canal operation and performance. Poor maintenance of the 
infrastructure results in poor performance in terms of water delivery through leaks. This 
subsequently lowers the schemes life span. Figure 2.4 shows a bifurcating system with lower order 
canals branching from the main one. At the point of bifurcating water division is realized by the 




Figure 2.4   The birfurcal system (Plusquellec, 2002) 
 
Figure 2.5 shows a hierarchical setting. The tertiary canals branch from the main canal. Tertiary 
units are established from the secondary canal. The system promotes locational unequal 
positioning which leads to unfair water distribution (Horst, 1998). Horst (1998) explains in both 
settings, the primary canal divides into secondary canals, which subsequently canal divides and 
supplies various tertiary units. Each tertiary canal has an outlet that is hydraulically designed as 



















Figure 2.5  The hierarchical system (Horst, 1998) 
 
Horst (1998) states that canal outlets are particularly critical because outlets control the discharge 
into water courses because of their size and hydraulic characteristics (orifice or flumes). The outlet 
dimensions are fixed, however, there are sluice gates along the canals that are adjustable to control 
flows (active human management). 
 
Canal outlets are also critical because beyond this point the flow is managed sequentially whereas 
above the canal outlet flow is managed simultaneously (Petr, 2003). Downstream of an outlet 
farmers receive water consecutively i.e. two farmers on a given field channel will not receive water 
simultaneously rather they will receive water in sequence according to a fixed weekly schedule. It 
is the farmer’s onus to convey water to their own plots by constructing tertiary canals and 
waterways. This typified a scenario where there was no on-farm development and it subsequently 
was a paradigm for irrigation development in many countries in the 1960s. This model promoted 
an accelerated evolution in irrigation. However, it did not suit countries where the smallholder 








implement up-to-date irrigation water delivery. This inevitably forced farmers to endure the 
orthodox methods of cultivation and irrigation that yielded poor harvests. 
 
2.8.3 Choice of technology 
 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) identified irrigation infrastructure as a fundamental constituent of 
economic growth and poverty mitigation i.e. it has the distinct ability to subdue economic growth 
potential at farm level. Infrastructure as an ongoing and continuous priority boosts competitiveness 
and productivity and underpins improvements in the HDI. A proposed choice of technology for 
irrigation should mirror the geo-social setting i.e., it must define its function and by properly 
aligning with the cultural, traditional and informal methods of water sharing. 
 
An irrigation scheme caters for a population with various and diverse nutritional needs thus 
promoting varying cropping patterns. Hence, the system design should be congruent with such 
factors. The level of technology should be at the same degree of ease of operation of the system 
thus WUAs and IMCs are central to the choice of technology to be implemented. Tortajada (2016) 
states that water control infrastructure designed in isolation with development policies is at a risk 
of not meeting the societal needs, as there will be a lack of effective management. Modern 
technology has emerged that regulates flow and control water appropriation for the farmers. 
 
These technologies aim to increase water use efficiency and from a design perspective to counter 
hydraulic instability from the manual gated operating systems. For equitable and more effective 
water use methods drip kits have been introduced amongst Indian and Nepalese smallholder 
farmers (Postel et al., 2001). Drip irrigation success is pinned on the type of crop cultivated and 
for many smallholder farmers vegetables are key to their diets, which go along with the drip 
technology (Postel, 1999). 
 
Automation of water control has been implemented through the use of Model Predictive Control 
(MPC) strategy (Negenborn et al., 2009). The automated systems were successfully implemented 




actions in a pre-defined way using measured disturbances only (Negenborn et al., 2009). The 
technology was however, limited to irrigation district with inert-dependent water schedules.  
 
2.9 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
There has been little qualitative and quantitative analysis on water governance and its interactions 
with irrigation systems design and operability in SISs in KwaZulu-Natal. Water governance 
involves the institutions processes, procedures,rules and regulations involved in water 
management and irrigation design narrows down toward technicality with no regard to the set 
institutions and procedures in place (Horst, 1998; Tortajada, 2016). The revitalised schemes still 
mirror the old designs that have been promoting discordancy between the Water Users and the 
functionality of the scheme. Thus there is a need to analyse and synergise the two for optimised 
water use efficiency, equitable water distribution, and ultimately attaining food security. 
 
The South African government policies have been effected with the bid to resuscitate and improve 
water handling techniques with little focus on technology improvements. The government’s sought 
to empower the marginalised by constructing irrigation schemes and allow them to run the 
schemes. The scheme operation were handed to the new scheme dwellers under the auspices of 
IMT. The IMT has become the prominent domestic agricultural policy in many countries (Howsam 
et al., 2003; Marshall, 2003). The move was to target efficient use of resources, limit liability on 
government and encourage farmers to actively participate in scheme matters. 
 
The initiative backfired on the government as the scheme managers inherited a system that was 
built during the colonial era. This rendered the scheme users and managers disempowered as they 
have little knowledge on operations and functionality of the water control infrastructure (Horst, 
1998). The point of departure is, therefore, infrastructure is a constant that is not built with a proper 
governance framework that caters for the dynamic local institutions. It was assumed that transfer 
of scheme management to farmers would foster better O&M systems, less conflicts and effective 
water management (Shah et al., 2002b). This has not been the case as water security is still an 
issue. Irrigators face challenges ranging from inadequacy, unequitable water distribution and an 




equipped with knowledge on canal sensitivity and flow perturbations. The knowledge allows water 
managers and bailiffs to pin point points where the water delivery system is most likely to deviate 
from the functional norm (Renault & Hemakumara, 1997). 
 
It is imperative to encourage PIM as this will allow water users and water managers to formulate 
within the existing governance framework information systems that allows them to identify points 
where unscheduled changes might occur along the water conveyance system. Hydraulic sensitivity 
is a major player in water allotment procedures, as losses and ineffective operation of the 
infrastructure contribute to the equity and reliability of irrigation water utility. Another point of 
departure is technology refurbishment focused i.e., infrastructure upgrades and revitalization are 
not consistent with water governance frameworks that exist in SISs (Horst, 1998). 
 
Scheme revitalisation has been implemented in a bid to improve water delivery. However, such 
efforts have been in vain since the operational requirements of the water control infrastructure 
clashes with indigenous socio-technical knowledge (Richards, 1985). The disconnect between 
design and operation is the chief cause of discrepancies between design assumptions and 
operational reality (Horst, 1998). Design assumptions look at policy planning, and mainly the type 
of water allocation procedures.  
 
Establishing a synergy between governance and water control infrastructure is essential as this can 
minimise water conflicts and promote effective water usage within the irrigation schemes. 
Understanding the condition of water control infrastructure and how the operability and 
functionality of the infrastructure relates to governance can address the shortfalls on governance 
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The condition of irrigation infrastructure deteriorates because of neglect, and the unwillingness of 
the irrigators to participate in operation and maintenance (O&M). Condition is the status of  
irrigation infrastructure that is structurally sound, adequate and has integrity. Poor structural 
condition can be attributed to a governance framework that does not relate to the existing 
infrastructure. Infrastructure longevity depends on O&M, thus institutional arrangements that have 
robust processes, procedures and enforcement of rules and regulations ensure prolonged 
infrastructure service-life. This study investigated and evaluated the condition of the existing water 
conveyancing, storage and control infrastructure at the Mooi River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS) and 
the Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme (TFIS), in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The study was 
premised on the hypothesis that the characteristics and requirements of the existing water control 
infrastructure was not consistent with water governance structures in the respective irrigation 
schemes. An Infrastructure Condition Assessment (ICA) was undertaken based on inspections and 
condition scoring or grading. In addition, technical experts were consulted to determine weights 
of the structural evaluation criteria using the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). Furthermore, 
the Fishbone “Ishikawa” Diagram and the Relative Causal Index (RCI) method were used to carry 




(technical experts and extension workers) to capture their perception on the causal factors. 
According to the study the Fishbone “Ishikawa” Diagram characterized, and identified 23 probable 
causal factors that led to infrastructure dilapidation. ICA revealed the poor condition of 
infrastructure i.e., deep cracks in canals and missing latches on hydrants. The RCI quantified the 
causal factors and revealed the convergance between technical experts (𝑡𝑒) and the extension 
workers (𝑒𝑥) regarding causal factors. The converging causal factors were maintenance 
(𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒 = 0.8, 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑒𝑥 = 0.7), people (𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒 = 0.7, 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑒𝑥 = 0.7), institutional (𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒 = 0.7,
𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑒𝑥 = 0.6) and environmental (𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒 = 0.8, 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑒𝑥 = 0.7). The study further revealed that, the 
stakeholders involved had points of divergence on causes of infrastructure decay. Follow-up 
questionnaires were again administered to capture the reasons of diverging thoughts. The 
stakeholders identified varying causal factors as accelerators to infrastructure dilapidation, for 
instance, the infrastructure designers argued that lack of compliance was a major driver to 
infrastructure dilapidation whereas extension workers thought otherwise. The study recommends 
participatory engagement in process and procedure design for enhanced infrastructure condition. 
 
Keywords: infrastructural condition assessment, relative causal index, root cause analysis, 




Irrigation infrastructure is an essential component of development. Governments in developing 
countries have invested a significant amount of resources in construction, maintenance and 
rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure (Chambers et al., 1989). Water is life, and it has been 
proven beyond doubt that new irrigation facilities have improved land and labor productivity of 
smallholder farmers, whenever they get access to the water (Ahluwalia, 1985; Boyce, 1987; 
Hossain, 1989). Infrastructure development leads to economic growth and reduces inequality. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) and Mwase & Yang (2012) noted that the more the government invests 
in infrastructure the better the prospects of economic growth. 
The growth theory, which is premised on infrastructure and growth, provides literature from a 
survey by Straub (2008) that gives evidence that infrastructure is a vehicle for growth. Functional 




subsequently results in multiple benefits (Adank, 2006). Low income countries are prone to water 
deficiencies because the water supply infrastructure is badly engineered and managed (Carter et 
al., 1999). For example, leaking canals result in poor water conveyance, which subsequently leads 
to unreliable water supplies (Sharaunga & Mudhara, 2016). Well maintained built infrastructure 
plays a pivotal role in ensuring water security (Sharaunga & Mudhara, 2016).  
 
Poor infrastructure condition in the sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) is compounded by the irrigation 
communities’ failure to maintain and run the operation and maintenance (O&M) programmes set 
out by the donor constructed infrastructure (Sakaki & Koga, 2013). In a bid to limit liability, 
governments transferred management to irrigators through Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) 
scheme (Vermillion, 1997). Water users’ failure to stretch their budget further exacerbate the 
deteriorating condition of the infrastructure. This consequently leads to poor infrastructure that 
stands neglected for years before proper maintenance is carried out (Shah et al., 2002a). 
 
Many irrigation schemes’ infrastructure have  backlogs or lagging in terms of maintenance due to 
deferred maintenance (Teicholz & Edgar, 2001). High transaction costs associated with operation 
and maintenance (O&M), inadequate support from government and NGOs have attributed to 
collapse in irrigation infrastructure in South Africa (Machethe, 2004; Fujiie et al., 2005; Muchara 
et al., 2014). Literature cited infrastructural problems as the leading cause of poor performance in 
South African irrigation schemes (Fanadzo, 2012). 
 
Despite substantial investments in upgrading infrastructure, the are reversed because the untrained, 
unskilled and less committed human capital do not effectively manage the structures (de Lange et 
al., 2000; Mnkeni et al., 2010). For example, Sinyolo et al. (2014) cited insufficient institutional 
support as a driver to infrastructure dilapidation in the Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme (TFIS). 
Muchara et al. (2014) argued lack of support as one of the causes of backlogs in O&M in the Mooi-
River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS). The irrigation schemes exhibit both similar and dissimilar 







Table 3.1 Some governance characteristic in MRIS and TFIS 
Irrigation scheme 
Governance aspect MRIS TFIS 
Land allocation Tribal authority Tribal authority 
Water allocation and access Scheduled irrigation Subject to fee payment 
Conflict management Reported to the scheme 
committee or tribal authority 
Executive committee or tribal 
authority 
Election of committee irrigators Irrigators 
Penalties for non-compliance Pay fines Not enforced 
Active stakeholders Techno-serve, DARD, Lima DARD and Lima 
 
The paper investigated and evaluated the condition of the water control infrastructure in TFIS and 
MRIS.. The objective of the study was to conduct an infrastructure condition assessment exercise 
and profile the condition of the water control infrastructure in the selected irrigation schemes. 
Furthermore, it sought to carry-out a root cause analysis to identify water governance related 
factors that contributed to infrastructure deterioration. 
 
3.2 Materials and Methods 
 
This section presents an overview of the two irrigation schemes their locations and characteristics. 
It further presents methods and tools used for data collection and analysis. 
 
3.2.1 Study site 
 
The study was conducted at two irrigation schemes, Mooi River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS) and 
Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme (TFIS) in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Both schemes are located 
in Msinga Local Municipality (Figure 3.1) in Midlands region of KwaZulu-Natal and they are 





Table 3.2  Some scheme characteristics of TFIS and MRIS (after Cousins, 2012; Fanadzo, 
2012; Gomo et al., 2014; Sinyolo et al., 2014) 
 TFIS MRIS 
Canal length (Km) 34 25 
Land area(Ha) 800 600 
No. of Plots 1500 842 
Year(s) of construction 1898 - 1902 After world war II 
Year of last rehabilitation 2013 On-going 
IMT 1997 1997 - 1998 
Number of blocks 8 15 
Main canal flow rates (m3.s-1) 0.1 to 0.4  0.36  
Management system Consultative and Democratic Consultative and Democratic 
Main crops  M*, T, SP**, C M*, T, SP**, C 














Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme (TFIS) 








3.2.2 Infrastructure condition assessment (ICA) 
 
Infrastructure Condition Assessment (ICA) is a continuous process that involves systematic 
gathering of information through observation, investigation, direct monitoring and reporting. 
Infrastructure assessment in itself is defined by deterministic and interrelated parameters (Afgan 
& Carvalho, 2002) as shown in Table 3.3. ICA capitalizes on multi-criteria assessment, which 
bridges uncertainties such as: differences in design codes by the various contractors hired to 
perform O&M and lack of in-service measurements and records. Such uncertainties complicate 
the evaluation of infrastructure (Ellingwood, 2005). 
 
Table 3.3  Deterministic and interrelated infrastructure parameters (after PEO, 2016) 
Criteria Definition 
Structural adequacy Assessed whether the current condition of the 
structure could withstand external shock e.g. 
vandalism. 
Structural efficiency Assessed whether the structures were built and or 
repaired to minimum requirement. 
Structural soundness Assessed if the structure is damaged or not and 
assessed the severity of the damage. 
Structural integrity Assessed whether the structure had the capacity to 
absorb damage. 
 
An infrastructure condition assessment based on condition scoring was adopted, as the condition 
scoring technique makes it possible to pin point defects (Le Gauffre et al., 2007). The condition 
scoring based on rating scale used by Le Gauffre et al. (2007) and Abbott et al. (2007) was adopted 
for this study (Table 3.4). Furthermore, a multi-criteria assessment outcome was employed based 








Table 3.4  Infrastructure condition assessment rating (after Abbott et al., 2007; Le Gauffre et 
al., 2007)  
 
3.2.3 Data collection and analysis 
 
A visual assessment and survey were undertaken on the irrigation schemes during August 2017 at 
Mooi-River and Tugela Ferry. Data was collected from all three strata of the schemes i.e., head, 
middle and tail sections (Table 3.5Error! Reference source not found.). A photo record was 
produced and defects were documented. The photo record showed hydraulic structure and their 
defects at 40 m to 50 m intervals along selected canal reaches. 
 









 Description Condition 
rating 
Excellent Components may still be new or may have been recently 
maintained 
1 
Good Hydraulic structures exhibit superficial wear and tear, minor 
defects observed 
0.8 
Fair Significant portions require maintenance. Infrastructure has 
suffered abuse or disrepair 
0.6 
Bad Significant portions have deteriorated badly. Maintenance 
needed. The infrastructure and some components have 
exceeded service life 
0.4 
Very bad Critically damaged components(s). Immediate repair needed. 0.2 
Strata Irrigation scheme 
 MRIS (Blocks) TFIS (Blocks) 
Head 2, 3 and 4 1 and 2 
Mid 5 and 9 4A and 4B 




Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme (TFIS) 
 
The scheme is located at approximate co-ordinates 28o 45’ S and 30o 21’ to 30o 26’E and the supply 
is from a weir on Thukela River (Figure 3.3). Average annual rainfall ranges from 650 mm - 1 400 
mm. The scheme has undergone numerous upgrades and maintenance since its inception in 1902 
(Cousins, 2013). The scheme is characterised by the following hydraulic infrastructure: 
 
Offtake and main supply route 
 
The offtake structure is situated 3 km upstream of the first irrigated fields and comprises of a weir 
at the base of a steep gorge on a left hand bend of the river. The control structure is situated on the 
outside of this bend and sluice gates control the first section of piping. The supply line comprises 
a combination of piping and parabolic, concrete lined canals. Some leaks were observed in the 




The scheme has 19 earthen-lined balancing dams and many seem to be unused. Approximately 
23% are in good condition. Dam repair will be a relatively easy process comprising of silt removal, 
reshaping and repairing of outlet pipes and valves. Distribution canals run through the fields at 
right angles to the contour. Irrigation is effected by diverting the flow by means of stones and earth 
or a shaped metal plate into lateral canals in the fields or plots. 
 
The earthen-lined balancing dams act as buffers for when the water levels drop below a certain 
level. This ensures there is equitable water distribution. A small number of dams are still in use, 
however, a majority have been breached and are considered unserviceable. 
 
Supply to the irrigated plots 
Supply through the irrigated fields comprise of the main canal with short sections of piping where 




link the canal across minor watercourses, dongas and tributaries. Due to lack of maintenance and, 










Figure 3.2  A water hydrant (a) with makeshift connections, (b) a canal with an illegal diversion 
point. Vegetative growth impedes water conveyance along the canal 
 
Mooi-River irrigation scheme (MRIS) 
 
The scheme is located on the banks of Mooi-River. Water is diverted by a weir constructed across 
the Mooi River into a parabolic canal, which runs for 20.8 km from the diversion point to the end 
of the scheme (DAEA, 2001). The irrigation scheme covers a land area of 600 ha demarcated into 
0.1 ha plots. However, some farmers are multiple land holders such that land ownership extends 
to 0.5 ha (Sharaunga & Mudhara, 2016). The scheme accommodates 842 farmers across 15 blocks 

























Figure 3.3 Schematic of Tugela Ferry irrigation scheme lay-out
Block 1 Block 4A Block 4B 
Block 7 
Block 6 Block 5 
Block 2 Block 3 





































Figure 3.4  Schematic lay-out of Mooi-River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS) 
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3.2.4 Hydraulic components of the Mooi-River irrigation scheme  
 
Transitions in the canal 
 
The 25 km MRIS long canal has transitions at various points. The canal shape and width varies 
across the scheme. The main canal is concrete lined canal with a parabolic shaped cross-section. 
The cross-sectional area and dimensions are inherently the same and only becomes smaller after 
chainage 14,200 m from the head end of the scheme. In some instances, the canal transits from a 










Figure 3.5  (a) Transition from canal to a ∅ 750 𝑚𝑚 pipe and (b) Typical parabolic shaped 




MRIS has 10 siphons located at strategic points (Figure 3.6). The design capacity of a siphon 
usually exceeds the capacity of the canal section by 20% and the velocities should be between 1 
m.s-1 and 3 m.s-1 (Element Consulting Engineers, 2014). Since most siphons have a local low point, 
it should be equipped with a scour valve (at least 300 mm diameter) to allow for proper flushing 
and dewatering of the siphon. The siphons have sediment scour chambers and can be used for 





















Figure 3.6  (a) The siphon inlet, (b) siphon outlet (c) the scouring chambers at head end 




Mooi-River irrigation scheme has 15 blocks and each block has 2 to 5 sluice gates or valves that 
divert water. The standard sluice in the canal comprises of a 300 mm by 300 mm plate covering a 
160 mm diameter pipe mouth or orifice. The sluice gate is operated by means of a long handle or 
a spindle that is lifted or turned to allow water to flow-through a partly opened orifice. Some cover 
slabs for the control valves adjacent to the canals were missing and the valves and gates were not 










The discharge weirs are installed along the MRIS canal (Figure 3.8). The spacing, lengths and 

































Side channel spillway 
 
These structures allow excess flow in the canal to be diverted back to the water source mainly the 
river (Figure 3.9). The structures maintain a safe freeboard in the canal. MRIS scheme had one 















The MRIS has three balancing dams (Table 3.6). These were constructed as a contingency in the 
wake of erratic water supply. 
 
Table 3.6 Balancing dam characteristics (Element Consulting Engineers, 2014) 
 
Block Characteristics Capacity (m3) 
6 Earth lined dam Unknown 
14 Plastic lined dams 16,000 




Three block have dams i.e., Block 6, Block 14 and Block 15 (Figure 3.10). The dams required 













Figure 3.10  (a) Balancing dam at Block 14 and (b) silted balancing dam at Block 6 
 
3.3 Sampling Procedure 
 
The study employed snowball sampling to identify possible respondents. Snowball sampling is a 
non-probability sampling method developed by Coleman (1958). As the name implies, the 
sampling population is derived from a hard to reach population (Goodman, 2011) or equivalently, 
hidden populations (Heckathorn, 2011). The method was predicted to work well in scenarios where 
the respondents were geographically dispersed and where the networks are difficult for outsiders 
to penetrate (Sudman & Kalton, 1986). 
 
A structured questionnaire was distributed to known extension workers in the TFIS and MRIS and 
technical experts. Technical experts were accessed via referral methods through the South African 
Institute of Agricultural Engineers (SAIAE). Interviewees evaluated the questionnaire based on 
their professional judgement considering the institutions, manpower, policies, maintenance, and 





questionnaire captured the extension workers and technical experts’ perception on factors causing 
infrastructure dilapidation. Furthermore, a follow-up questionnaire was issued to capture the 
diverging view points of the respondents. Since the study does not depend on statistical conception 
a minimum of five respondents can be used for analysis (Gündüz et al,. 2012). 
 
3.4 Root Cause Analysis (RCA): Fishbone “Ishikawa” Diagram 
 
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is a process used to investigate and compartmentalize the root causes 
of a problem (Rooney & Heuvel, 2004). RCA is an effective tool used in identifying “what”, “how” 
and “why” a problem occurs, originally developed for psychology and systems engineering. RCA 
has since expanded to other facets of human development exercises like medicine (Wu et al., 
2008), infrastructure assessment (Rosenfeld, 2013), computer server systems (Fraenkel et al., 
2004), to mention a few. A favorable tool for RCA is the Fishbone “Ishikawa” diagram because 
of the following advantages: it aids in determining the root cause of a problem using a holistic and 
structured approach, suggestive presentation for the correlations between an event (effect) and its 
multiple happening causes are easily depicted, and . it is easy to use compared to other methods 
like tree diagrams, and Event and Causal Factor Analysis (ECFA) (Berry et al., 1990; Sarazen, 
1990; Dorsch et al., 1997; Ilie & Ciocoiu, 2010): 
 
3.5 Determining the Relative Causal Index (RCI) 
 
Kometa et al. (1994), Sambasivan & Soon (2007) and Gündüz et al. (2012) used the Relative 
Causal Index (RCI) method to rank and determine the major causal factors to a common  problem. 
This study adopted the same approach, however for adaptability the study employed a three-point 
scale range: 3 (Very likely), 2: (Somewhat likely) and 1: (Not likely). The adopted three-point 










𝑅𝐶𝐼  = Relative Causal Index, 
𝑤 = Weighting given to each factor by the respondents, 
𝐴  = highest weight i.e., 3 in this case, and 
𝑁  = total number of respondents. 
The RCI has values ranging from 0 to 1, and the higher the RCI the most likely the factor was to 
cause infrastructure deterioration (Kometa et al., 1994). 
 
3.6 Results and Discussion 
 
This section presents the research findings and the discussion. 
 
3.6.1 Visual assessment and hydraulic infrastructure survey: Mooi River and Tugela Ferry 
irrigation schemes 
 
The results from the site inspections showed cracks and failures in the concrete lining with 
associated leaks and collapse, in severe cases, was evident in both schemes. The farmers had no 
recollection of how long the cracks had been present. There were sightings of exposed aggregate 
on the canal lining leaving a poor rough finish, siltation by pebbles, aggregates and sand 
accelerated by years of no maintenance combined with the removal of the storm water berm in 
some places. There were also sightings of broken and lost sluices, which resulted in unrestricted 
flow, illegal connections that allowed continuous abstraction and displaced and eroded expansion 























Figure 3.11 Example of canal condition along the scheme, (a) vertical crack (MRIS) (b) 
debris filled canal (TFIS), (c) malfunctioning sluice gate (MRIS), (d) collapsed 
canal wall (TFIS), (e) damaged embankment (MRIS), (f) illegal connection 























Figure 3.12 (a) Hydrant and hosepipe in pristine condition in TFIS, (b) a vandalised hydrant in 
TFIS, (c) leaking secondary pipe abstracting from Tugela river supplying Block 4B 
 
3.6.2 Infrastructure condition assessment (ICA) 
 
The seven sampled sites in the MRIS showed that the canals at the upper reaches of the scheme 
(Blocks 2, 3 and 4) were marginally deteriorated (Figure 3.13). The canals at the middle section 
and tail end of the scheme were inpoor condition (Blocks 5, 9, 11 and 15), with condition ratings 
(𝐶𝑅) of 0.2, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.3 respectively, and thus needed immediate maintenance. The sluice 
gates (Figure 3.13) in Blocks 2 (𝐶𝑅 = 0.4), 3 (𝐶𝑅 = 0.3), 4 (𝐶𝑅 = 0.4), 5 (𝐶𝑅 = 0.4), 
9(𝐶𝑅 = 0.2), and 11 (𝐶𝑅 = 0.2), were all in critically poor condition except for the gates in Block 
15. The regulators also showed signs of deterioration that required replacement. All siphons were 
functional with some components exhibiting deterioration due to abuse and vandalism. 
The facility condition assessment for the TFIS sampled six sites. The results (Figure 3.14) revealed 
deteriorated condition of the hydrants (abstraction points). Due to the varying infrastructure 
characteristics, the dysfunctional status varied across the scheme. The secondary canal system for 
the Blocks 1 (𝐶𝑅 = 0.4), and 2 (𝐶𝑅 = 0.4), at the head end exhibited defective canal linings that 
needed repairing and replacement. The hosepipes used for water application in the field had a 𝐶𝑅 




of 0.2, thus exhibited critical damage and required replacement. The 𝐶𝑅 = 04 for hydrants 
indicated significant damage had occurred and maintenance was due. The PVC pipes for Block 

























































































3.6.3 Root cause analysis: fishbone “ishikawa” diagram 
 
For this study, 23 causal sub-factors were identified and categorized into 5 distinct factors namely: 
Maintenance, People, Institutions, Policies, and Environment,. The categories were similar to other 
studies carried out in different industries (Odeh & Battaineh, 2002; Long et al., 2004; Assaf & Al-
Hejji, 2006; Gündüz et al., 2012). The factors and sub-factors were visualized using the Fishbone 
“Ishikawa” Diagram (Figure 3.15): 
 Maintenance related factors. These were identified as causal drivers for accelerated 
infrastructure dilapidation. IMT led to farmers being responsible of O&M. Literature 
documents the effects of IMT on infrastructure (Johnson III, 1997; Vermillion, 1997; Fujiie 
et al., 2005). Based on the literature, the study extracted four sub-factors and these were: 
water users’ unwillingness to contribute to the scheme, none existence of an O&M 
programme, water users failure to pay for water, and management’s disinterest in 
infrastructure management (Figure 3.15). 
 
 People driven factors. Factors comprised of the second group of causal drivers. Horst 
(1998) argued that the human dimension is the epicentre of infrastructure management. 
The argument identified eight sub-factors namely: insufficient manpower, a lack of formal 
education, no participation, no training, no reporting of damaged infrastructure, negligent 
irrigators, no reporting of unlawful behaviour and lack of financial contribution (Figure 
3.15). 
 
 Institutions related factors. These were identified as another set of factors that cause 
infrastructure deterioration. Institutional arrangements in schemes are either farmer led or 
agency led. Studies have revealed that institutions are at the center of the infrastructure 
handling and management (Lam, 1998; Chereni, 2007; Denby et al., 2017). Based on this 
literature, six sub-factors were: identified and these were unaccountability, unfair election 
process, none existence of WUAs and IMCs, unsustainable stakeholder intervention, 
ineffective implementation of the constitution and disharmony between WUAs and 





 Policy related factors. These were the fourth group of causal factors. Several studies have 
identified policy issues as having an impact on infrastructure condition (Cherlet & Venot, 
2013; Manzungu & Derman, 2016). From this category, three sub-factors were identified 
and these were: ineffective water management laws, ineffective irrigation policies and poor 
rule enforcement (Figure 3.15). 
 
 Environment related factors. These were identified as the fifth group of factors that 
contribute to infrastructure deterioration. Literature reveals how environmental and 
naturally occurring hazards have a negative impact on infrastructure (Mirza, 2003; Smith, 
2013). Based on the literature, the study identified two sub-factors such as vegetative 
growth and induced soil failure (Figure 3.15). 
 
After the RCA, the identified causal factors were quantified using RCI. The RCI ranked the causal 
factors and the results are shown in Table 3.7. Based on the ranking for TFIS and MRIS, the top 
six causal factors as perceived by technical experts (Table 3.7) were: water users unwilling to 
participate in O&M (RCI = 0.93), waters users unwilling to contribute financially to scheme 
maintenance (RCI = 0.926), recklessness of water users (RCI = 0.93), none existence of an O&M 
plan (RCI = 0.89), lack of compliance (RCI = 0.85) and lack of formal education (RCI = 0.40). 
 
The top six causal factors as perceived by the extension (Table 3.7) workers were: non-existence 
of WUAs and IMCs (RCI = 0.87), WUAs and IMCs ineffectiveness in implementing constitution 
(RCI = 0.800), none existence of an O&M programme (RCI = 0.80), incapacitated scheme 
managers (RCI= 0.800) farmers unwilling to pay for water use (RCI = 0.67) and lack of formal 
education (RCI = 0.40). Table 3.7 shows a comparative assessment of the quantified causal factors 




























No formal education 
No financial contribution 
towards scheme maintenance Reckless irrigators 
No participation 
No training 
Insufficient manpower: No Bailiffs 
Unfair election process 
Unsustainable stakeholder intervention 
Unaccountability 
Non-existence of IMC & WUAs 
Ineffective water management laws 
Ineffective irrigation policies 
Poor rule enforcement 
Management disinterest in 
infrastructure management 
Water users’ failure to pay for water 




Reporting unlawful behaviour 
Figure 3.15  Fishbone "Ishikawa" Diagram for TFIS and MRIS. 
None existence of an 
O&M programme 
Not reporting damaged infrastructure 
Disharmony between WUAs 
and traditional councils 





  Extension workers Technical experts 
  (𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑒𝑤) Rank (𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒) Rank 
Factor group Sub-factor causing deterioration     
      
Maintenance None existence of an O&M programme 0.8 2 0.9 4 
Water users unwilling to contribute to scheme maintenance 0.5 11 0.9 8 
Uncommitted management 0.5 8 0.9 4 
Water users not willing to pay for water use 0.7 5 0.8 12 
      
People Water users unwilling to report unlawful behaviour 0.60 7 0.7 17 
Water user not willing to contribute financially to the scheme 0.47 11 0.9 1 
Water users unwilling to participate in O&M 0.33 17 0.9 1 
Water users lacking irrigation training 0.47 11 0.9 8 
A lack of formal education for the water users 0.40 16 0.2 23 
Water users not reporting damaged infrastructure 0.33 17 0.9 4 
Scheme managers incapacitated by insufficient labour 0.80 2 0.9 4 
Recklessness of water users 0.53 8 0.9 1 
      
Institutions None  existing WUAs and IMC 0.8 1 0.8 12 
WUAs and IMC ineffective in implementing the constitution 0.8 0 0.8 11 
Unfair election process in the scheme 0.3 5 0.6 22 
Unsustainable stakeholder intervention 0.5 3 0.8 12 
Disharmony between farmer organisations and traditional council 0.5 3 0.7 19 
Unaccountable institutions 0.3 5 0.8 12 
      
Policies No compliance 0.3 17 0.9 8 
Ineffective irrigation water laws 0.3 17 0.7 21 
Ineffective irrigation water policies 0.2 23 0.7 19 
      
Environment Vegetative growth 0.8 5 0.8 12 
Soil failure on embankments 0.6 8 0.7 17 
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The results indicated some convergence points from both stakeholders. The two groups showed 
similar positions with respect to the factors shown in Table 3.8. 
 
Table 3.8  Converging points for the two stakeholders 
  Relative Causal Index 





Maintenance None existence of an O&M programme 0.9 0.8 
Water users unwilling to report unlawful behaviour 0.8 0.7 
Farmers not willing to pay for water use 0.7 0.6 
People Scheme managers incapacitated 0.9 0.8 
lack of formal education 0.4 0.4 
Institutions None existence of WUAs and IMCs 0.8 0.9 
WUAs and IMCs ineffective in implementing 
constitution 
0.8 0.8 
Disharmony between farmers and traditional councils 0.7 0.6 
Environment Soil failure on embankments 0.7 0.6 
Vegetative growth 0.8 0.8 
 
3.7 Further Discussion on Root Cause Analysis and Relative Causal Index 
 
The results as evidenced by the 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒 = 0.9 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑒𝑤 = 0.8 (Table 3.8) revealed that the 
farmers often lacked a proper operation and maintenance (O&M) programme, which consequently 
contributed to accelerated infrastructure deterioration. The hand-overtake-over of the scheme 
management from government to farmers has accelerated infrastructure dilapidation. Irrigation 
Management Transfer (IMT), in reality, meant farmers adopted a technology they never had a hand 
in during development, thus there is minimal understanding of the maintenance and operation 
requirement of the infrastructure. According to Frederiksen & Vissia (1998) Water Users 
Association (WUAs) and Irrigation Management Committees (IMCs) are key to pushing O&M 
agendas because the clustered WUAs are supposed to coordinate within the scheme to put in place 
an O&M programme. Johnson (1997) argued that the lack of will from institutions in organizing 
and adopting O&M strategies ultimately results in failed irrigation infrastructure.  
Unwillingness to pay for water was identified as another convergence point for the different 




has had negative impacts on scheme maintenance, and a participatory approach ensures that 
farmers are more involved and as such possess a capacity to monitor and execute O&M (Marothia, 
2002). 
 
Water payments to WUAs and public agencies are used for funding O&M exercises in the scheme. 
However, farmers’ refusal to pay for water strains the schemes budget hence leading to inadequate 
funds for O&M. Water payments represent an administrative order that mediate water and its 
means of abstraction, i.e. infrastructure handling (Scott, 1998; Alba et al., 2016). Boelens & 
Zwarteveen (2005) argued that water payments awards a water license to the farmer, as such, it 
gives a sense of formal authority to irrigators that handle infrastructure, consequently if one is 
legally authorized to handle infrastructure they do so with extra care. Water payments provide a 
good basis for allocating funds for maintenance, and a lack there-of contributes to infrastructure 
decay. van Koppen et al. (2004), Mdee et al. (2014) and van Koppen et al. (2016) argued that 
irrigators’ refusal to pay for water was motivated by their belief that God provided water for free 
and hence they should not pay tariffs, which subsequently limits the budget intended for O&M. 
Samad (2002) and Burton (2010) also revealed that in situations where WUAs and IMCs do not 
receive water payments, the sustainability of the water delivery and control infrastructure is 
compromised. 
 
People driven factors such as incapacitated scheme management, in terms of numbers and a lack 
of formal education 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒 = 04, 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑒𝑤 = 0.4, were also converging points. A formal education 
enlightens irrigators, meaning an educated irrigator is most likely to make informed decisions. The 
finding is consistent with Nyambose & Jumbe (2013) who argued that education is a helpful tool 
for farmers in analyzing choices and making decisions about forecasts of the anticipated benefits 
of participating and actively contributing to better infrastructure handling, thus limiting abuse and 
vandalism. 
 
Results showed institutional arrangements contributed to infrastructure deterioration as per the 
stakeholders view. The results revealed that WUAs and IMCs are almost non-existent at farm and 
village level (𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒 = 0.8, 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑒𝑤 = 0.9), and where they exist, they fail to implement the 




the traditional leadership. The institutional arrangements tend not to be clearly defined as to who 
does what and when, i.e. roles and responsibilities. During scheme construction, the irrigation 
officers worked closely with the contractors and sidelined the intended beneficiaries. This top-
down model led to poor policy articulation when the schemes were finally handed to farmers. 
Wester (2008) defines policy articulation as a process by which policy actors support, modify and 
translate the tool so that an agreed outcome is reached. 
 
Poor policy articulation has adverse effects at the irrigation scheme level. These results are in line 
with the findings by Manzungu & Derman (2016) who argued that institutions like the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that fund irrigation scheme projects in Africa set policy 
regarding water allocation distribution and infrastructure handling. However, there is serious 
policy disarticulation at national level and eventually at farm level. The disarticulation by the 
institutions leads to discordancy and constricts the necessary action needed to be taken to meet the 
infrastructure requirements at the lowest water-use level. Under environmental factors, vegetative 
growth (𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒 = 0.8, 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑒𝑤 = 0.8) (see Figure 3.17) and soil failure (𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒 = 0.7, 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑒𝑤 = 0.6) 
were also identified by both parties as contributors to infrastructure dilapidation. Repeated tractor 



































Figure 3.17  Vegetative growth invading canals in MRIS 
 
Figure 3.16  (a) Hydrant and hosepipe in pristine condition, (b) An abused hydrant in 
TFIS, (c) An abandoned hosepipe in the sun and (d) Leaking secondary pipe 







3.7.1 Diverging points 
 
The sharp difference were noted on Unaccountable institutions (𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒 = 0.8 and 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑒𝑤 = 03) for 
technical experts and extension workers respectively. The technical experts ranked highly the 
causal factor citing installation of scheme managers is not based on merit. The technical experts 
survey further revealed that incompetent individuals running organisations tend not to make 
informed decisions thus policy disarticulation and, more often than not, abuse of scheme funds 
that are meant for O&M. This finding is also consistent with Denby et al. (2017), who argued that 
irrigator participation and integration challenges were deeply aligned to flawed institutional 
accountability. Denby et al. (2017) further argue that newly installed governance models , e.g. 
creation of WUAs and IMCs, created a leadership vacuum, and they stated: 
“In South Africa the creation of new decentralised institutions (WUAs and IMCs) 
parallel to existing governmental water institutions (DWA) brought up questions of 
who is ultimately in charge, who is accountable or holds the mandate to solve 
scheme challenges” 
Another point of divergence was on lack of compliance. The technical experts greatly attributed 
non-compliance as the major driver of irrigation infrastructure decay (𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒 = 0.9) whereas the 
extension workers did not highly rank the factor (𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑒𝑤 = 0.3). The survey revealed that water 
managers are mainly vulnerable and are scapegoats to scheme failures. 
 
Policy issues were divergent between the extension workers and the technical experts. The 
technical experts ranked highly policy issues, i.e. ineffective irrigation policies and ineffective 
irrigation water laws. According to technical experts the ineffective irrigation policies and water 
laws both had 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒 = 0.7 and 𝑅𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒 = 0.3 respectively. It appeared the extension workers would 
acknowledge policy disarticulation. Furthermore, the technical experts cited the lack of adherence 
to policy if it exists at all. The experts’ notion is consistent with a study by North (1995) who 
argued that informal policy is dominant in schemes as it is embedded in the particular history and 
social fabric of the irrigators hence, promoting discordancy between the formal and the informal. 
The extension workers position can be justified since skills are passed from one generation to the 




with the study by Denby et al. (2017) who argued that policy formulation is not inclusive hence 
discrepancies exist between the policy designers and the end user as such the formal way of 
handling infrastructure conflicts with the informal methods embedded in the irrigation schemes. 
 
3.8 Conclusion  
 
The infrastructure in Mooi-River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS) and Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme 
(TFIS) requires maintenance and major components require replacement. The canals for both 
schemes had serious cracks and the expansion joints were dislocated. Hydrants in TFIS were 
missing components and makeshift elastics bands were used to clip the hose to the hydrant. The 
hosepipes leaked showing signs of neglect. The farmers would also leave  hoses lying in the field 
and the PVC material is subjected continuous heating and cooling due to day and night time 
temperature, thus accelerating rapid expansion and cooling and hence cracks. For both schemes 
canal lining had holes because people drilled holes to illegally abstract water. Furthermore, sluices 
abstraction valves had missing handles, and vegetative growth invaded the water conveyance 
channels.  
The stakeholders i.e., technical experts and extension workers converged on perceptions regarding 
certain institutional arrangements such as WUAs assessment and support and how they affected 
infrastructure. They also converged on the sub-factor “lack of education” as a lowly ranking 
contributor to infrastructure deterioration. This conflicted with literature as it suggests that a formal 
education aids irrigators to make informed decisions. The study revealed many diverging points 
between stakeholders and a follow-up questionnaire revealed how there was discordancy amongst 
institutions i.e., the water users association, irrigation management committees and government. 
Stakeholder intervention  ranked highly according to the technical experts perception. The 
technical experts pointed out that a lack of a training programme, combined with scheme design, 
rehabilitation and revitalization left farmers with knowledge gaps as per the operation and 
management (O&M) action plan. Disharmony amongst stakeholders facilitates omission made by 






3.9 Recommendations  
 
It is highly recommended that government employs extra hands to aid scheme managers in MRIS 
since the predominant problems were somehow labour/manpower related. In addition, a 
participatory irrigation design approach is highly encouraged, as this will include the intended 
beneficiary of the infrastructure. Farmers and farmer organisations require training for effective 
and enhanced scheme functionality. Also irrigation and water management training improves the 
farmers appreciation of the schemes strategic goals which are for example, ensuring proper 
handling and maintenance of CPRs such as water conveyance infrastructure will improve water 
access and conveyance efficiency which, subsequently improves crop production. The shortage of 
water bailiffs led to poor scheme monitoring and hence increased infrastructure abuse. For both 
irrigation schemes institutional accountability was necessary and appointing scheme managers at 
farm level based on merit would ensure proper policy articulation. Financial autonomy would go 
a long way to ensure proper financial management system, .i.e. farmers will self-organise to collect 
water fees that will augment the O&M budget. In addition, if WUAs and IMCs are given financial 
autonomy they will freely set targets and strategies meant to realise scheme goals. Hiring external 
agencies to take over O&M will facilitate transparency and consistency in maintenance of 
infrastructure. Institutional accountability can be enhanced by financial autonomy, as farmers will 
be much involved in scheme affairs. A further enquiry is needed in investigating the enforcement 
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Abstract 
 
Water governance is a multi-level and multi-actor decision-making process. The multi-actors are 
grouped under formal and informal institutions, and they collectively determine how irrigation 
scheme infrastructure is operated or managed. Infrastructure and governance interactions are 
precursors to a fully functional irrigation scheme, consequently enhancing agricultural 
productivity, which subsequently boosts rural economies. Water control infrastructure is a critical 
component that determines management of canal operation and use, and therefore, has to be built 
within a water governance framework that considers multisector and multilevel actors. This paper 
sought to establish an operational and functional relationship between water control infrastructure 
and the existing water governance in Mooi River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS) and Tugela Ferry 
Irrigation Scheme (TFIS). The technology adopted was imposed rather than being setup in a  
participatory manner and only considered engineering and hydraulics and not human and 
institutional aspects. This study uses a fuzzy model to establish a link between water control 
infrastructure, i.e., its characteristics, operational requirements, on one hand, and the existing water 
governance frameworks in the respective irrigation schemes, on the other. The approach was based 




Similarity to Ideal Solution (FTOPSIS). The FAHP techniques was used to determine the fuzzy 
weight of the water control infrastructure aspects and the FTOPSIS was used to rank the water 
governance aspects, i.e., institutions, processes, procedures, rules and regulations, with respect to 
the infrastructure weights. Due to the high uncertainty and vagueness, the linguistic variable were 
expressed, as triangular fuzzy numbers. Questionnaires were administered to five irrigation experts 
from each scheme. The Closeness Coefficient (𝐶𝐶𝑖) was used for ranking. The study revealed that 
TFIS had strong institutional setups (𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑆 = 0.18), as compared to MRIS (𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐼𝑆 = 0.13). 
However, TFIS showed a low ranking on rules and regulation (𝐶𝐶𝑇𝐹𝐼𝑆 = 0.14). Farmers 
unwillingness to pay water tariffs and contribute funds for operation and maintenance is 
illuminated under the rules and regulations governance pillar. A collective and participatory 
approach is required to improve on the water governance shortcomings. In consequent, this will 
improve the scheme performance. 
 
Keywords: Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP), Fuzzy Technique for Order of 




Water control infrastructure in Smallholder Irrigation Schemes (SISs) is supposed to be engineered 
for resilience. Resilience can be defined as the ability of the water control infrastructure to absorb 
natural and man-made disturbances while retaining functionality. Infrastructure remains constant 
in the face of scheme dynamic social changes and changes in self-organization and the capacity to 
adapt to stress. Irrigation schemes are an indispensable component of economic growth, and 
poverty reduction in SISs across Africa (Tortajada, 2016). Although infrastructure in SISs is 
critical for water conveyance, it needs to closely relate to policies, institutions (both formal and 
informal), laws, regulations, management practices, and participation models for the efficient 
management of water resources and water-related services (Molden et al., 2014). A resilient 
irrigation scheme exists when there is a strong functional and operational relationship between the 
water control infrastructure and the prevailing governance. Governance is anticipated to result in 




canals, weirs, sluice gates and siphons. A typical canal layout in a scheme is depicted (Figure 4.1) 
and shows how the system branches into lower order canals.  
 
Figure 4.1 Typical bifurcating system (Plusquellec, 2002) 
 
The bifurcating points are characterised by various water control infrastructures such as sluice 
gates, valves (Figure 4.2) (Horst, 1998). Gates and abstraction valves allow water abstraction from 
the main canal to the secondary canals (Figure 4.2). Water is diverted to the tertiary canals and it 















Letsoalo & Van Averbeke (2006) showed the dilapidated state of  infrastructure in South Africa’s 
SISs. The Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) policy saw the transferal of  responsibility of the 
scheme Operation and Maintenance (O&M) from government to farmers. However, poor 
participation and poor institutional arrangements in the irrigation schemes have accelerated 
infrastructure decay, consequently affecting scheme performance (Sharaunga & Mudhara, 2018). 
The next section of the article defines and contextualises water governance. The objective of the 
study was to asses the functional and operational relationship between water control infrastructure 
and the water governance systems in selected SISs The next section defines the tools used for data 
analysis. Furthermore, the conceptual water governance-infrastructure model is depicted. The 
paper finally presents results and discussion. 
 
4.2 Water Governance 
 
Water governance in smallholder irrigation schemes encompasses institutions, processes, 
procedures rules and regulations involved in water management (Rogers & Hall, 2003). 
Governance (Figure 4.3) is dynamic since it is greatly influenced by the human dimension, as such 
continuous revision of the water governance framework is needed so that it matches up to the 
dynamic needs of irrigators (Horst, 1998; Rogers & Hall, 2003). Institutions are primarily involved 
in policy design and putting into place processes and procedures that are socially acceptable. The 
institutions must mobilise resources to support the policies. The process followed in policy 
formulation and implementation ensures that scheme goals are met. The scheme goals encompass 
efficiently providing equitable water to irrigators (Rogers & Hall, 2003). A participatory approach 
in SISs management facilitates decentralized management units that boost participation and farmer 
interests in achieving optimal irrigation performance (Mwendera & Chilonda, 2013 as cited by ; 
Sharaunga & Mudhara, 2018). Huitema et al. (2009) also concurred that de-centralizing 
institutions facilitates active farmer participation. 
 
Irrigation schemes do not exist in a vacuum, as such there can never be a one size fits all policy, 
strategy and processes in one irrigation scheme as diverse cultures and dietary needs exist (OECD, 
2015). Improved interactions between governance aspects facilitates an improvement of the water 




infrastructure, formulate policies for continued trust and engagement amongst water managers, 








Figure 4.3 Water governance framework showing interactions amongst governance aspects in a 
typical smallholder irrigation scheme 
 
 
Figure 4.4 The water governance cycle (adopted from OECD, 2015) 
To achieve optimal performance levels in the scheme the technology and the water governance 
framework have to interact. Matching management capability and operational flexibility to the 
level of technology leads to enhanced irrigation performance. However, the imposed technology 
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technology upgrades have cumbersome operational requirements that do not match the 
management capability of the irrigators. Unsustainable management in SISs stems from the 
disconnection between the physical and technical attributes of the irrigation scheme, socio-
economic characteristics of the irrigators, local knowledge of the irrigators and irrigation 
governance structures (Marothia, 2002). 
 
4.3 Basic concepts of fuzzy theory and their link to water governance 
 
This section will define the fuzzy definitions according to Buckley (1985), Chen (2000) and Lee 
et al. (2012a). 
Definition 1 
A fuzzy set ?̃? in a universe of discourse Χ is characterized by a membership function  𝜇?̃?(𝑥) which 
associates each element 𝑥 in 𝑋 a real number in the interval [0,1]. The function value 𝜇?̃?(𝑥) is 
termed the grade of membership of 𝑥 in ?̃? (Zadeh, 1965). 
Definition 2 
Van Laarhoven & Pedrycz (1983) stated that a positive triangular fuzzy number (TFN) ?̃? 
=(𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3); where 𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3 are three real numbers satisfying 𝑎1 > 0 and 𝑎1  ≤ 𝑎2  ≤ 𝑎3 are 
defined by predetermined fuzzy number e.g.1, 3, 5 to mention a few. Error! Reference source 














𝑎1 - Lower bound, 𝑎2 - Modal value and 𝑎3 - Upper bound 
 
 
Table 4.1 Membership function of a Fuzzy number after (after Yeh & Deng, 1997) 
Fuzzy Number Membership Function 
1̃ (1, 1̃, 3) 
?̃? (𝑥 − 2, 𝑥, 𝑥 + 2) for 𝑥 = 3, 5, 7 
9̃ (7, 9̃, 9) 
 
In this study, the fuzzy numbers are a conversion of linguistic variables used by experts to assign 
fuzzy weights to water control infrastructure aspects. In addition, the fuzzy numbers are also used 




Lee et al. (2012a) suggested that if ?̃? = (𝑚1, 𝑚2, 𝑚3) and ?̃? = (𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑛3) are two triangular 
numbers then the vertex method is defined to calculate the distance between them. 
𝑑(?̃? , ?̃?) = √
1
3
 [(𝑚1 − 𝑛1)2 + (𝑚2 − 𝑛2)2 + (𝑚3 − 𝑛3)2]   4.1 
 
The underlying concept as used in this study is to compute Euclidean distances, which are 
contextualised as Positive Ideal Solutions (PIS) and Negative Ideal Solutions (NIS). The ideal state 
where farmers obtain a correct irrigation function is achieved by increasing PIS and minimising 
NIS. 
Definition 4 
A fuzzy linguistic variable is a variable whose domain is a collection of pre-specified fuzzy 




non-numerical .i.e., they are words or sentences in a natural or artificial language  The linguistic 
variables are converted to numerical fuzzy numbers for ease of computation (see Definition 2). 
 
4.4 Study Area and Methodology 
 
This section contains the location of the research sites, methods used for identifying experts and 
data collection tools used. 
 
4.4.1 Study area 
 
The study was carried out in Mooi-River irrigation Scheme and Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme. 
Mooi River is located in uMsinga Local Municipality in the Umzinyathi District of KwaZulu-
Natal province (see Figure 4.5). The scheme is located between 28º 56` longitude, latitude 30º 22` 
(diversion point) and. 28º 56` S, 30º 29` (lower end of scheme) (Gomo, 2012). Tugela Ferry 
Irrigation Scheme is also located in uMsinga municipality between 28º 44`S and 30º 26`E. The 
irrigation scheme ranks as one of the largest in KZN with a land area of 840 ha (Cousins, 2013). 
Both schemes are located in former homelands that still exist as poverty nodes. Subsistence 

















Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme 










4.4.2 Multi-criteria decision making 
 
The study applied a Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) model based on fuzzy theory 
(Zadeh, 1996) to establish a functional and operational relationship between water control 
infrastructure and the water governance. Human judgement cannot be presented in crisp sets but 
can be defined by a fuzzy sets and fuzzy linguistic terms (Zadeh, 1965). A fuzzy linguistic variable 
is a variable whose domain is a collection of pre-specified fuzzy concepts (Ngan, 2011) and they 
collectively define the Saaty scale (Saaty, 1990). The MCDM based on the fuzzy analytical 
hierarchy process (FAHP) and the Fuzzy Technique for Order Preference by Ssimilarity to Ideal 
Solution (FTOPSIS), was employed to establish a link between infrastructural functionality and 
operational reality vs the schemes water governance aspects. 
 
4.4.3 Data collection for FAHP and FTOPSIS 
 
For data collection, a questionnairre survey was conducted. Five questionnaires were administered 
per scheme. The questionnaire targeted experts in the respective schemes since the FAHP depends 
on expert judgement rather than statistical conception for evaluation. Saaty & Vargas (1994) as 
cited by Lee et al. (2012a) suggested that three to seven experts are necessary for AHP. Lee et al. 
(2012a) used five experts, whereas Ertuğrul & Karakaşoğlu (2009) used 15 experts. For this study 
because of availability nine experts were used. The first section of the questionnaire asked experts 
to do a pairwise comparison amongst selected infrastructure aspect. Therafter, it asked experts to 
rate the performance of each infrastructure aspect with respect to the water governance aspects. 
 
4.4.4 Expert selection 
 
Lee et al. (2012a) defined experts as the people who are most likely to experience a service such 
that their responses to the questionnaire are representative and accurately reflect actual service 
qualities. In this case the experts are the people in the scheme that are most likely to experience 
the full irrigation service utility. Theoretically, expertise is closely related to the structure of 




cognitive capabilities (Bolger & Wright, 1992) as cited by (Lee et al., 2012b). Thus, in this study 
the self-reporting parameters: level of education and the number of years one has been irrigating 
were used as bench-marks for expertise. The experts considered were agricultural engineers and 
extension workers directly involved with each respective scheme. 
 
4.4.5 The Adopted Infrastructure-Governance Conceptual Model 
 
The following sets describe the infrastructure-governance model shown in Figure 4.6: 
 A set of m possible governance aspects denoted by 𝐺 = {𝐺1, 𝐺2, … … … . 𝐺𝑚}; 
 A set of n infrastructure aspects called 𝑃 = {𝑃1, 𝑃2, … 𝑃𝑗 , … . 𝑃𝑛} and a set of 𝑆𝑗 criteria with 
respect to aspect 𝑃𝑗 measured by {𝑃𝑗1, 𝑃𝑗2, … … , 𝑃𝑗𝑆𝑗}; 
 A fuzzy performance ratings of governance aspects  𝐺𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2, … . . 𝑚) with respect to 
aspects 𝑃𝑗(𝑗 = 1, 2, … … . 𝑛) called ?̃?={?̃?𝑖𝑗, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . 𝑚 , 𝑗 = 1, 2, … 𝑛}; 
 A set of fuzzy importance weight of each infrastructure aspect called ?̃? ={𝑤1 , 𝑤2, … . 𝑤𝑛} 
and fuzzy importance weight of each infrastructure criterion with respect to each aspect can 
be represented as; 𝑤𝑗𝑆𝑗  , 𝑗 = 1, 2, … . 𝑛. 
The hierarchy consists of four layers; the first layer is the ultimate goal and the second layer depicts 






























































































Goal Infrastructure aspects Infrastructure sub-aspects Governance 
Sensitivity of conveyance 𝑃11 
Sensitivity of delivery 𝑃12 
Sensitivity to setting 𝑃13 
Correct irrigation function 𝑃21 
Uncommon occurrence of delivery disruptions 𝑃22 
Effective info on water delivery service 𝑃23 
Uniform flow rates 𝑃24 
Problem dealing mechanism 𝑃31 































Kahraman & Kaya (2012) used the intelligence building system with the fuzzy AHP and TOPSIS. 
The aspect selection was based on five categories shown in Error! Reference source not found. 
below. 
 
Table 4.2 Intelligent building assessment criteria used in the study  
Category Aspects 
Engineering Working efficiency, functionality and 
responsiveness 
Socio-cultural Functionality and usability 
Technological Work efficiency and intelligent systems 
 
4.4.6 Fuzzy analytical hierarchy process 
 
The orthodox AHP has limitations and tends to be imprecise when dealing with the vague nature 
of linguistic assessments. According to Erensal et al. (2006), triangular fuzzy numbers are used to 
represent common sense linguistic statements, which are  the key premise of pair-wise comparison. 
In FAHP fuzzy numbers are used for the pairwise comparison and computing the corresponding 
fuzzy weights (Buckley, 1985; Boender et al., 1989). Various methods deviated from Saaty’s 
Hierarchical Analysis for obtaining weights (Csutora & Buckley, 2001). Van Laarhoven & 
Pedrycz (1983) applied a logarithmic regression model to compute the fuzzy weight estimates, and 
this model facilitated multiple estimates that solved the problems of missing data. 
 
4.5 Applying the FAHP for weight determination 
 
Linguistic variables (3) were used to assess the relative importance of the infrastructure aspects. 
The linguistic variables can be expressed by triangular fuzzy numbers (TFN). Experts were tasked 









Table 4.3  Linguistic variables for fuzzy weights of each decision element (after Wu et al., 
2010; Zhou & Lu, 2012) 





(1, 1̃, 3) (1, 1, 
1
3
) Equal importance Two elements contribute equally to the objective 








Experience and judgment slightly favour one element over 
another 









) Strong Importance Experience and judgment strongly favour one element over 
another 









) Very strong 
importance 
One element is favoured very strongly over another, it 
dominance is demonstrated in practice 









) Extreme importance The evidence favouring one element over another is of the 
highest possible order of affirmation 
 2,4,6,8 can be used to express intermediate values 
 
For each expert 𝑘 a fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix is deduced i.e.,  
?̃?𝑘 =  [?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ]          4.2 
Where: 
?̃?𝑘 = the fuzzy positive reciprocal matrix of expert 𝑘, 
?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑘  = the relative importance between the 𝑖-th decision element and the 𝑗-th decision 
element; 
?̃?𝑖𝑗=1, ∨ 𝑖 = 𝑗 and (?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑘 )
−1
,∨ 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3 … . , 𝑛 







        4.3 
Where: 
?̃?𝑖= aggregated fuzzy weight of total number of experts, 
𝑤𝑖
𝑘 = fuzzy weight of infrastructure aspect from the 𝑘𝑡ℎ expert, and 




4.6 Fuzzy technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution  
 
The FTOPSIS method developed by Yoon & Hwang (1995) is a very useful tool in MCDM. 
FTOPSIS is a practical and useful technique for ranking and selecting a number of possible 
alternatives by measuring Euclidean distances. The underlying logic of this technique is there are 
two solutions: the Positive Ideal Solution (PIS) and Negative Ideal Solution (NIS). The PIS should 
be increased and NIS are those which need to be decreased so that farmers get the most out of the 
irrigation service utility (Benitez et al., 2007). The FTOPSIS is an extension of the TOPSIS 
method as used in fuzzy environments (Chen, 2000; Chen et al., 2006; Yong, 2006), and this deals 
with the inherent vagueness and of the decision makers data. The resultant Euclidean distances are 
not to be weighed (Deng et al., 2000). The goal of this technique is to determine PIS and the NIS, 
and then find the closeness coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝑖. Linguistic variables are used to define the aspects as 
shown in Table 4.4. The best performing governance aspect should have the shortest distance from 
the PIS and the farthest distance from the NIS. In order to determine the distances Euclidean 
distances, for each governance constituent are computed. 
 








4.6.1 Using the FTOPSIS method to rank governance aspects 
 
This method was employed after the fuzzy weights of the infrastructure aspects were computed. 
The FTOPSIS would then compute the closeness coefficients ( 𝐶𝐶𝑖) for each governance aspect. 
The step by step method for calculating the  𝐶𝐶𝑖 is listed below. 
Linguistic Variable TFN 
Very Poor (1, 1, 3) 
Poor (1, 3, 5) 
Fair (3, 5, 7) 
Good (5, 7, 9) 




Step1: The experts’ opinions are integrated, the fuzzy ratings of the 𝑘 evaluators is aggregated by 
equation 4.3. Hence, the original fuzzy rating ?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑝 of governance aspect 𝐺𝑖 with respect to the 𝑝th 
criterion under the 𝑗th aspect is calculated as: 





      







, 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑝 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘{?̃?𝑖𝑗𝑝
𝑘 } 
Step 2: Aggregate the experts’ fuzzy ratings ?̃?𝑖𝑗  (𝑖 = 1, 2, . . , 𝑚, 𝑗 = 1, 2𝑚, … , 𝑛) of Governance 






𝑝=1 ∗ ?̃?𝑗𝑝)       4.4 
Where: 
?̃?𝑗𝑝  = the fuzzy importance weight of criteria 𝑝 in aspect 𝑗, and 
𝑆𝑗  = the number of criteria in aspect 𝑗. 
The MCDM model can be represented as an aggregated matrix as shown in equation 5. 
 ?̃? = [
?̃?11 ?̃?12 ⋯ ?̃?1𝑛
?̃?21 ?̃?22 … ?̃?2𝑛
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
?̃?𝑚1 ?̃?𝑚2 ⋯ ?̃?𝑚𝑛
] = [?̃?𝑖𝑗]𝑚∗𝑛     4.5 
Where: 
?̃?𝑖𝑗  (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚; 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛) is the fuzzy ratings of the Governance aspects 𝐺𝑖  (𝑖 = 1, 2,
3, 4) with respect to aspects 𝐶𝑗  (𝑗 = 1, … . , 𝑛) 
 
The weight vector ?̃? of aspects 𝐶𝑗  (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛) is given by equation 4.6 





Step 3: After obtaining ?̃? = [?̃?𝑖𝑗]𝑚∗𝑛 determine the FPIS (𝐴
+) and FNIS (𝐴−) then the 𝐶𝐶𝑖. The 
elements 𝑣𝑖𝑗 are normalized positive fuzzy numbers and their ranges belong to the closed interval 
[0, 1]. Thus, the fuzzy positive ideal solution (FPIS 𝐴+ ) and the fuzzy negative ideal solution 
(FNIS, 𝐴− ) can be defined as: 𝑣𝑗 = (1, 1, 1), 𝑣𝑗 =  (0, 0, 0), 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3 … … . . , 𝑛. 
Where: 
 𝐴+ = {𝑣1
∗, 𝑣2
∗, … . , 𝑣𝑛
∗} maximum values      4.7 
 𝐴− = {𝑣1
−, 𝑣2
−, … . , 𝑣𝑛
−} minimum values     4.8 
 
The distances of each governance aspect from FPIS and FNIS is calculated as follows: 
 𝑑𝑖
+ = √∑ (𝑣𝑖𝑗 − 𝑣𝑗
∗𝑛
𝑗=1 )
2  , 𝑗 = 1, 2, … . , 𝐽     4.9 
 𝑑𝑖
− = √∑ (𝑣𝑖𝑗 − 𝑣𝑗
−𝑛
𝑗=1 )
2  , 𝑖 = 1, 2, … . , 𝐽      4.10 
Where: 
 𝑣𝑗
+ are the positive maximum values 
 𝑣𝑗
− are the minimum values 
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The  𝐶𝐶𝑖 has values ranging from 0 to 1 (0 not inclusive). The higher the  𝐶𝐶𝑖 the better performing 
the aspect is with respect to infrastructure characteristics and requirements. 
 
4.7 Results and Discussion 
 
The experts’ aggregated matrices for weights are given in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. The respective 
tables show how the fuzzy weights for infrastructure attributes performed against one another. The 
infrastructure aspects were compared with respect to the modal fuzzy weight (see definitions). The 




decision makers from the respective irrigation schemes show that reliability ranks high in TFIS 
whereas responsiveness takes priority in MRIS. Sensitivity for both schemes ranked low, with the 
lowest in TFIS. The uniform flow rate ranked high on the priority of the evaluators (Appendix I) 
however, the occurrence of delivery disruptions had the least effect in the opinion of the evaluators. 
Mechanism for dealing with problems (Appendix I) took priority for the MRIS whilst response to 
farmers’ complaints ranked high in TFIS (see Appendix I). 
 
The sensitivity aspects allow one to understand the operation characteristics of the hydraulic 
structures. By comparison, the sensitivity weight for TFIS was higher than that for MRIS. The 
infrastructure at MRIS is mostly gated hence precision is needed in its operation to avoid discharge 
deviations at block level. Downstream farmers tend to suffer the most deviations between the 
targeted and the actual delivered discharge (Renault & Hemakumara, 1997). The finding concurs 
with Shahrokhnia et al. (2009) who argued that poor water equity is attributed to inaccurate and 
lack of understanding of the water control infrastructure. Renault (2000b) also argued that optimal 
operational measures stem from the water managers’ adequate understanding of water control 
infrastructure. 
 
The sensitivity to delivery weights are similar for both schemes because, according to the experts, 
the distributary canal that feeds the tertiary unit plays an important role in the scheme as irrigators 
can easily manipulate it. Irrigators use artificial regulators, e.g., piling trash and stones to increase 
head in the distribution canal (Renault & Hemakumara, 1997). Consequently, less water will be 
available in the main canal (conveyance). Shahrokhnia et al. (2009) also pointed to the artificial 
regulators constructed along the distribution canal to gain head, so farmers ultimately are 
concerned with delivery than they are with conveyance in the main canal. 
 
By taking the modal value, the Eigen vectors for the reliability aspect under MRIS and TFIS show 
that farmers value uniform flow rate and a correct irrigation function. Uniform flow rate follows a 
correct irrigation function. The manner in which hydraulic structures are operated facilitate a 




understanding of the canal system and of  adequate understating of the operation leads to a 
compromised performance. 
 
Table 4.5 Aggregated decision matrix for Mooi River Irrigation Scheme evaluators 
 
Table 4.6 Aggregated decision matrix for Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme evaluators 
 
4.7.1 Euclidean distances 
 
This section presents the FPIS and the FNIS. The elements 𝑣𝑖𝑗 are normalized positive fuzzy 
numbers and their ranges belong to the closed interval [0, 1]. Thus, the fuzzy positive ideal solution 
(FPIS, 𝐴∗ ) and the fuzzy negative ideal solution (FNIS, 𝐴− ) can be defined as: 𝑣𝑗 = (1, 1, 1), 
𝑣𝑗 =  (0, 0, 0), respectively 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3 … … . . , 𝑛. Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 show the relative 
closeness of each governance aspect to the ideal solution. Rules and regulations ranked higher in 
MRIS followed by processes, procedures and then institutions, based on the Closeness Coefficients 
(𝐶𝐶𝑖). In the case of TFIS institutions and processes ranked higher followed by procedures, rules 




 Sensitivity Reliability Responsiveness 
Sensitivity 0.00, 0.24, 0.30 0.31, 0.36, 0.59 0.14, 0.16, 0.46 
Reliability 0.26, 0.28, 0.37 0.00, 0.45, 0.52 0.46, 0.50, 0.54 
Responsiveness 0.44, 0.48, 0.63 0.16, 0.18, 0.42 0.00, 0.40, 0.40 
 Sensitivity Reliability Responsiveness 
Sensitivity 0.00, 0.28, 0.34 0.26, 0.31, 0.59 0.19, 0.20, 0.23 
Reliability 0.29, 0.31, 0.42 0.00, 0.59, 0.61 0.60,0.66, 0.78 




Table 4.7 Relative closeness for TFIS 
 
Table 4.8 Relative closeness for MRIS 
 
4.7.2 Managerial implications 
 
The ranking in TFIS based on 𝐶𝐶𝑖 followed the order: Institutions, Processes, Procedures, Rules 
and regulations. The institution here are the Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries 
(DAFF), Department of Water and Sanitation, Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform (DRDLR), Water Users Associations (WUAs) and Irrigation Management Committees 
(IMCs) at irrigation scheme level. The government departments are actively involved in irrigation 
scheme rehabilitation and water appropriation at provincial and district level. The WUAs, which 
comprise of selected farmer committees, are the established institutions at farm level. WUAs are 




Institutions have been defined as “complexes of norms and behaviours that persist over time by 
serving collectively valued purposes”(Uphoff et al., 1991). In TFIS, high levels of institutional 
involvement at scheme level and at farm level exist. Systems in place facilitate uniform flow rates, 
effective information dissemination, avoiding delivery disruptions (reliability). On the contrary, 
MRIS institutions ranked low amongst the governance aspects. This showed that despite massive 
     
Institutions 2.49 0.54 3.03 0.18 
Processes 2.56 0.53 3.09 0.18 
Procedures 2.61 0.52 3.13 0.17 
Rules & Regulations 2.66 0.44 3.10 0.14 
     
Institutions 2.68 0.42 3.09 0.13 
Processes 2.56 0.52 3.08 0.17 
Procedures 2.53 0.48 3.01 0.16 
Rules& Regulations 2.43 0.59 3.02 0.20 
𝑑∗ 𝑑− 𝑑∗+ 𝑑− 𝐶𝐶𝑖 




institutional investments in water conveyance and distribution structures, the institutional 
arrangements and organisation was low. Improper institutional arrangements have a bearing on 
water allocation and subsequently on water availability. The institutional arrangements in MRIS 
are as follows: the DAFF, which vests powers to scheme organisations (WUAs and tribal 
authorities). The poor institutional mechanism for harmonising the players tend to lead to 
unaccountability in infrastructure O&M. This consequently leads to a poor performing scheme 
with deteriorating infrastructure. 
 
Taylor (2002) also observed that poor institutional mechanisms that harmonise the active players 
in the irrigation scheme leads to a domino effect were there is lack of maintenance of water control 
infrastructure and subsequently poor conveyance and water scarcity. This finding also concurs 
with Afrasiabikia et al. (2017) who argued that institutional investments are countered by the 
traditional operation of the water control structures- thus there is zero regard of scientific modes 
of operation e.g. factoring issues to do with sensitivity in canal reaches. Water shortages have been 
cited in MRIS and the scheme is currently undergoing rehabilitation. The low level of organization 
can be attributed to the failure of agencies to break down and simplify the levels of operation. 
Creating low levels of operation harmonises the various levels of management by the organization 
(Yang et al. (2003). Many activities are handled informally in the scheme, which could be another 
reason as to why institutions are ranking low in Mooi-River Irrigation Scheme. However, the case 
be it formally or informally there is some degree of organization at each level (farm level, sub-




The procedures extend to selection of operational methods and this translates to the processes, as 
discussed. From the findings, the level of interaction of procedures and infrastructure are low, and 
this is attributed to complex operation methods and the misunderstanding of the consequences 
involved in setting out or adopting a selected operation method. Ankum (1996) stated that the role 
of institutions is to systematically plan and select operational procedures that lead to identifying 
how water control infrastructure is operated, maintained and how water is distributed through the 




The set-out protocols for on-demand water delivery must be responsive, and the relative 
responsiveness at the Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme is low comparing to sensitivity and 
reliability. Sensitive points within an irrigation canal are points were water flow regimes frequently 
deviate from the normal flow, and having key knowledge of these points allows targeted actions 
for frequent inspection and operational decisions than others. Procedures in place for both schemes 
ranked third meaning low farmer participation in operation and maintenance (O&M) programs. 
An ongoing O&M exercise improves on canal sensitivity and system operability. The findings in 
this study resonate with Renault (2000a) who argued that the lack of procedural systems that 
monitor the irrigation schemes status for enhanced infrastructure operations and maintenance 
contribute to poor understanding of the water control infrastructure. 
Upon construction and installation, the water control infrastructure has its operational requirement, 
however; it is poorly assimilated by the irrigators. This resonates with study by Horst (1998) and 
North (1995) cited by Denby et al. (2017) who argued that there exists a margin between design 
assumptions and operational realities where by designers stipulate operational procedures for 
improved irrigation functions whilst the irrigators “naturally” shift back to adopted traditional 
norms and knowledge. The procedures involved herewith also include information gathering by 
water users. The information is essential in formulating smart information systems that facilitate 
easy canal operation and management. The gated systems in MRIS present a challenge, as they 
require day-to-day operation; hence, the low ranking for both MRIS and TFIS can also be 





∗ = 0.90  and 𝑑𝑖
∗ = 0.93  for MRIS and TFIS under sensitivity respectively, (Table 4.9 and  
Table 4.10) indicate that the constituents of process e.g. WUAs and IMCs support were adequately 
capacitated. Regulator and sluice gate operation has a bearing on head changes and flow rates 
along the main conveyance canal, thus the high 𝑑𝑖
∗ value showed a proper design process regarding 
precision in gate and regulator handling to maintain uniform flow rates and avoid flow 
perturbations. A study by Ertsen (2010) argued as  follows: irrigation as an agricultural practice 
should be formulated around resilient water governance processes that adequately understand flow 
manipulation in short periods of times rather than managing volumes. The high 𝑑𝑖




high understanding by the water managers at scheme and farm levels of the complex water 
conveyance and distribution system. According to Renault & Hemakumara (1999) such high level 
of optimal canal operation are attributed to water governance processes that ensure accurate 
information and precision in the definition of targets with respect to the setting of structures. 
Another crucial advantage that aids the governance processes is the existence of fixed structures 
that require minimal on no human operation. 
 
The 𝑑𝑖
∗ value for TFIS (0.85) (see Table 4.9) ranked higher than that of MRIS (0.80) (see  
Table 4.10) under reliability. This brings into question the effectiveness of the Processes 
constituent: Irrigation scheduling and water distribution plan. From descriptive 8% of TFIS 
irrigators were not satisfied with the irrigation schedule where 52% in MRIS were dissatisfied with 
the irrigation schedule. This meant that there was common occurrence in delivery disruptions; 
there was also ineffective information on water delivery service. On demand water delivery is 
based on understanding flow variations during seasons and adaptive management techniques have 
to be adopted. In MRIS, the process of diverting water flows from a river to the canals is relatively 
ineffective compared to that in Tugela Ferry. Ertsen & van der Spek (2009) also attributed the 
varying water distribution to the hydraulic behaviours for canal and gated structures under different 
management styles. 
 
The responsive attribute show had a value of 0.77 for TFIS, typically lower than that of MRIS 
(0.86). The rate of responsiveness to farmers’ complaints and the problem dealing mechanism was  
low because of the lack of resources such as availability of water bailiffs and lack of properly 
structured tariffs. Water payments varied across the scheme. Renault & Hemakumara (1999) cited 
that  for manually operated schemes, the biggest resource inputs are transportation and man-power 
and both require financial resource from the water levies. Government and other related agencies 
ought to provide manpower in the form of water bailiffs. 
 
Rules and Regulations 
 
The schemes have a set of modulated rules for canal operation. These rules facilitate the 




ideal solution for the respective irrigation differs by a huge margin. Whilst the MRIS exhibits to 
almost ideal, TFIS is the opposite. For a value of 0.975 in MRIS there is 0.578 in TFIS (see Table 
4.9 and  
Table 4.10 respectively), this means that there is adherence to operational rules and regulatory 
procedures involved in monitoring sensitive points within the parent canal for MRIS. The water 
managers are better equipped with knowledge of where perturbations occur along the parent canal 
and they have proper regulatory measures that facilitate the readjustment to prevent deviation to 
the command area 
 
Table 4.9 Governance-Infrastructure aspects and the Euclidean distances for TFIS 
 







Blocks 1, 2 and 3 in TFIS still use canals, and farmers at the tertiary units tend to block regulators 
with trash just so to increase upstream water levels (Shahrokhnia et al., 2009). Operational rules 
determine functionality and operational consequence. Poor set of operational rules result in high 
sensitivity i.e. flow deviations, which subsequently leads to poor hydraulic performance. The study 
revealed that MRIS has a set of practical rules that govern water capture, conveyance and delivery 
at the three levels of conveyance, which are parent/main canal, secondary distribution canal and 









Sensitivity 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.92 
Reliability 0.76 0.85 0.81 0.85 









Sensitivity 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.85 
Reliability 0.88 0.80 0.83 0.79 
Responsiveness 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.79 
𝑑∗ 𝑑∗ 𝑑∗ 𝑑∗ 




whereas compliance based approaches in TFIS are a cause for low adherence to stipulated rules 
for the scheme. 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
The FAHP and FTOPSIS model used in this study sought to establish a link between infrastructure 
aspect and water governance in smallholder irrigation schemes. The study determined most 
important criteria using weight determination for the infrastructure aspects and its criteria.  The 
study showed that three out of four governance constituents were in harmony with infrastructure 
characteristics and requirements. The FTOPSIS method utilizes the Euclidean distance 
measurement to determine the distance of each governance constituent with respect to 
infrastructure aspects and criteria from the ideal solution. The distance is closed within [0, 1] 
interval with the fuzzy distance of (1, 1, 1) being ideal. Therefore, the study concluded that TFIS 
had better institutional arrangements than MRIS. It was also found out that MRIS had better 
enforcement approaches of rules and regulations. 
 
The overall rankings with respect to closeness coefficients 𝐶𝐶𝑖, in descending order, showed that 
institutions, processes, procedures, rules and regulations for TFIS whilst the overall ranking in 
descending order at Mooi-River Irrigation Scheme was rules and regulations, processes, 
procedures, institutions. This has differing managerial implications. The processes involved in 
achieving a correct irrigation function for TFIS rank high because of infrastructure upgrades. The 
infrastructure upgrade from canal system to piped network requires less handling thus, the human 
dimension is minimised. Institutional setup in MRIS are weak, i.e., the multi-stakeholders at multi-
levels need to engage to aid in improved irrigation performance. The farmers in MRIS follow rules, 
but informal rules are predominant in the scheme. TFIS has a strong institutional setup as they 
enjoy positive and active stakeholder engagement. This consequently leads to enhanced processes 
that lead to dependable and reliable water supply. 
 
Adaptive management is key in ensuring that the level of technology is at par with the water 
governance framework in a place, particularly by the water managers. Poor management fails to 
reconcile the relationship between hydraulic infrastructure and its intended function of providing 




government, traditional leaders) is not the only reason for varying governance performance in the 
schemes. Omission by policy makers to consult and engage the grassroots often leads to non-




The results showed rules and regulation were lacking in TFIS. It is recommended that irrigation 
water users and their institutions focus more time and resources in ensuring compliance. The 
processes required for attaining a correct irrigation function were close to the desired levels. The 
study findings can be used for equipping water managers and policy makers at various levels to 
address the shortcomings in SIS governance for enhanced irrigation system and scheme 
performance. In future studies other MCDM methods like ELECTRE, or PROMETHUS can be 
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Abstract 
 
Water adequacy is central to maximized agricultural production in irrigation schemes. Smallholder 
irrigation schemes (SISs) are designed to distribute water efficiently, adequately and equitably. 
Water governance defined as the institutions, processes, procedures, rules and regulations involved 
in water management plays an important role in water allocation and subsequently water adequacy. 
Poor crop production and consequently poverty in Smallholder Irrigation Schemes (SIS) can be 
partly attributed to water inadequacy of. This research aimed at investigating the impacts water 
governance had on adequacy of water in irrigation schemes and it was premised on the hypothesis 
that governance had no effect on water adequacy. Water adequacy describes water supply relative 
to demand. Adequacy indicates whether the water delivery system supplies the demand to a section 
in the irrigation scheme over a period of time (daily, monthly or seasonally). Two irrigation 
schemes, Mooi River (MRIS) and Tugela Ferry Irrigation Schemes (TFIS) were used as case 
studies. A descriptive analysis showed that 86% of the farmers in TFIS had adequate water, 
whereas 24% in MRIS had water adequacy. A Binary Logit model was employed to investigate 
the factors that influence water adequacy among irrigators. The regression model identified eight 
statistically significant factors that influenced water adequacy, and these were irrigation scheme, 
location of plot within the scheme, training in water management, training in irrigation, irrigators’ 
knowledge about the government’s aims in SISs, availability of water licenses, payment of water 




influenced water adequacy in the selected SISs. The study recommended that the schemes put 
procedures and protocols in place to support and aid irrigators to enhance scheme governance. 
 




Agricultural water withdrawals account for 72% of the global surface and groundwater, and the 
abstraction is about 90% in developing countries (Wisser et al., 2008). Erratic rainfalls occur in 
South Africa affect crop production, and irrigation is the best alternative to augment the water 
deficit (Van Averbeke et al., 2011). Developing countries have invested heavily in irrigation 
infrastructure as a means to mitigate rural poverty. Such investments coupled with improved crop 
production technologies and fertiliser application processes, plant breeding has contributed to 
countries attaining food security (Gorantiwar & Smout, 2005). An irrigation system is a physical 
water delivery network comprising of subsystems that supply water to land by means of artificial 
canals and ditches, and the system also has a socio-economic dimension that operates and derive 
benefits from the infrastructure. Hence, it is set to attain farm level agricultural production goals 
such as maximizing net economic and social welfare benefits (Molden & Gates, 1990). 
Performance indicators to evaluate irrigation service utility need to be coupled with an assessment 
of the social aspects in the Smallholder Irrigation Schemes (SISs). 
 
Despite massive investments, the performance of SISs has remained below expectations (Shah et 
al., 2002a; Van Averbeke et al., 2011; Sinyolo et al., 2014; van Koppen et al., 2018). Indicators 
(both static and dynamic) such as institutional framework, water resource use, irrigation area, 
irrigation technology, agricultural productivity, and poverty and food security have been used to 
assess the performance of SISs and are centered on water adequacy criterion (Svendsen et al., 
2009). Water adequacy is the capacity of a supply source to meet the demand for multi- purposes 
such as irrigation and domestic uses (Frederick, 2013). According to Mehta et al. (2017) adequacy 
can be defined as the availability of water for food, energy, domestic supply and irrigation. Water 
adequacy is dependent on the dynamic parameters such as water resource use and institutional 




Irrigation scheme performance is judged by the adequacy characteristic. Adequate supply and good 
governance will yield the desired irrigation scheme goals (Abernethy, 1990). Water adequacy 
entails delivery of the required amount of water at the right time and is a function of the condition 
of the hydraulic infrastructure and the governance structures in place (Figure 5.1). The human 
dimension encompasses design of delivery schedules, operation and maintenance of water control 
infrastructure (Molden & Gates, 1990; Horst, 1998). Water Users Associations (WUAs) distribute 












Figure 5.1  Relationship between physical and governance attributes that influence water 
adequacy (adopted from Taylor, 2002) 
 
Various studies have been undertaken that investigate farmer perception of water security and 
water use efficiency (Gomo et al., 2014; Sharaunga & Mudhara, 2016; Alcon et al., 2017). 
However, not much investigation has been done on assessing the impacts of water governance on 
water adequacy .The management of Common Pool Resources (CPRs) such as availing adequate 
canal irrigation water and the maintenance of hydraulic infrastructure are key to improved crop 
production and poverty alleviation. However, SISs still remain poverty nodes despite the potential 
benefits of irrigation water and the conveyance system (Van Averbeke et al., 2011). This study 
investigated infrastructural and socio-economic factors that influenced water adequacy for the 
irrigators in MRIS and TFIS. The objective of the study was to assess the influence of water 
governance on adequacy of water for crop production. 
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5.2 Model Specification 
 
There is not much literature on the use of empirical models in trying to investigate governance 
issues that influence water adequacy. Speelman et al. (2008) applied a Tobit regression model 
from data generated by the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to investigate water use efficiency 
in smallholder irrigation schemes in North-West Province, South Africa. Various statistical tools 
allow data processing and the most common are the generalized linear models and the Logit and 
Probit models (Cakmakyapan & Goktas, 2013). Both Logit and Probit can be used to investigate 
the influence of governance on adequacy because the dependent variable is a binary variable. 
Careful consideration has to be taken in order to select the best performing model between the two. 
Supporting literature used the logit as it is stable for a large population size (Amemiya, 1981; 
Maddala, 1986; Cakmakyapan & Goktas, 2013; Sharaunga & Mudhara, 2016). According to 
Gomo et al. (2014) and Damisa et al. (2008) the advantages of using the Logit model are its ease 
to compute and interpret than the Probit models, it eliminates heteroskedasticity, i.e., the 
probability does not increase linearly with a unit change in the value of the independent variable 
and the computation of the logistic distribution guarantees the rate of the probabilities to always 
lie between the interval 0 and 1. 
 
5.3 Materials and Methods 
 
This section contains the study site description, data collection and analysis methods. 
 
5.3.1 Study site 
 
The study was carried out in Mooi-River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS) and Tugela Ferry Irrigation 
Schemes (TFIS). The two irrigation schemes are located in the Msinga District of KwaZulu-Natal, 
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5.3.1.1 Mooi-River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS) 
 
The scheme is located along the floodplains of the Mooi-River in Midlands region in KwaZulu-
Natal province (Gomo, 2012). The scheme accommodates 842 farmers over 600 hectares of land. 
Land units are 0.1 ha in size but farmers tend to have more than one plot (Sharaunga & Mudhara, 
2016). For ease of management and water distribution the scheme is divided into 15 blocks and 
each block has its own water management and allocation committee (Gomo, 2012). The upper 
section has Blocks 1-5, the mid-section has Blocks 6 – 11 and the tail section comprises of 
irrigators in Blocks 12 – 15 (Muchara et al., 2014). 
 
Water is diverted from a weir constructed across the Mooi-River into a parabolic canal, which runs 
for 20.8 km from the diversion point to the end of the scheme (DAEA, 2001). The concrete lined 
canal with a top width of 2.0 m and a depth of 1 m is designed to convey approximately 0.36 m3s-
1 (DAEA, 2001). The canal either feeds directly into the field or into night-storage/balancing dams. 
Distribution canals are used to convey water from the balancing dams to the fields as per the 
irrigation schedule. A diesel pump is used by tail-end user to abstract water from the Mooi-River 
to the canal. The diesel pump augments the irrigation canal water (Muchara et al., 2014). 
 
The scheme (see Figure 5.3) is said to have been constructed by the South African National Army 
in the early 20th century as a goodwill gesture to the locals. Initially the scheme had earthen lined 



















Figure 5.3 Schematic of Mooi-River Irrigation Scheme lay out 
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5.3.1.2 Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme (TFIS) 
 
The scheme is located on both banks of the Thukela River near Tugela Ferry town, in the Msinga 
Local Municipality. The approximate co-ordinates of the scheme entrance are: S 28° 45” 46.5’ E 
30° 26” 33.2’ (Mnkeni et al., 2010; UWP_Consulting, 2012). With a land area of 800 hectares, an 
estimated area of 500 hectares is cultivated by approximately 1500 producers (Cousins, 2012; 
Sharaunga & Mudhara, 2016). 
 
Blocks 1 – 3 are on the right bank of the Thukela River (Figure 5.4). The scheme abstracts water 
from the Thukela River at a weir approximately 4 km upstream of Block 1. Water is transported 
under gravity to the scheme through a parabolic canal pipeline to Block 1. Block 1 is the first block 
to receive water from the main canal. The main canal at this point is 2.1 m across the top and has 
a capacity of 0.4 m3.s-1 (UWP_Consulting, 2012). 
 
Block 4 is on the right bank of the Thukela River downstream of Block 3. It is separated from 
Block 3 by a headland that protrudes towards the river. Due to failure of the connecting pipeline 
between Block 3 and Block 4, it is no longer connected to the main canal supply. The installed 
pump station provides water for irrigation; the water is pumped into a night storage dam where it 
is conveyed to the fields through existing concrete lined canals. The canal section is an estimated 
1.1 m across the top and the average carrying capacity is 0.1 m3.s-1and reduced to 0.014 m3.s-1 
towards the tail end. 
 
Block 5 lies on the left bank of the river and water supply is from the main canal via an inverted 
siphon across the Thukela River. Block 6 is not functional due to tribal politics. Block 7 has two 
divisions namely Block 7A and Block 7B. The block has been cut off from the main supply canal 
due to the failure of the Sampofu River aqueduct and the siphons through the town of Tugela Ferry. 




















Figure 5.4 Schematic of Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme lay out 
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5.4 Data collection 
 
Data was collected from the two irrigation schemes (TFIS and MRIS). Table 5.1 shows the detailed 
stratification of the irrigation schemes. 
 
Table 5.1  Stratification of TFIS and MRIS 
*SP = Sampled population 
 
Each scheme was divided into 3 sections, where each exhibited similar characteristics in terms of 
water availability and irrigation days. Each stratum was further divided into 3 sections from which 
the sample was taken i.e., Upper, Middle, and Tail for farmers located closer to the water source,in 
the middle and further away respectively. The sample size was 240 for both schemes and was 
determined by Raosoft® (Incorporation, 2010) sample calculator at 95% confidence level. 
 
A structured questionnaire was administered to 240 randomly selected farmers from both schemes. 
Five local isiZulu speakers acted as enumerators to administer the questionnaire. Age, gender, 
irrigation training and adequacy were among the recorded variables by the questionnaire. The 
description and coding for the variables assumed to influence adequacy of water are shown in 
Table 5.2. The model processed 15 selected independent variables. 
  Irrigation scheme 
  MRIS TFIS 
Stratum Water availability Blocks SP Blocks SP 
Head section  Always available 1 - 4 40 1-3 37 
Mid-section  Intermittently available 5 -11 52 5 & 4A 52 




Variable Code Description Hypothesis 
Location in block BLCK Location of plot in relation to main supply line 
Dummy; 1 if located at tail and 0 otherwise 
Farmers closer to the main supply line  
have adequate water 
Location in 
district (MRIS vs 
TFIS) 
LOC_DISTRCT Methods used for water abstraction, conveyance and application 
in the respective schemes 
Area dummy: 1 if household is from Mooi-River and 0 Tugela 
Ferry 




WAMTR Determination of farmers who have received water management 
training 
Dummy; 1 if farmer had training and 0 otherwise 
Training improves water adequacy 
Irrigation training IRRTR Determination of farmers who have received irrigation training 
Dummy; 1 if farmer had training and 0 otherwise 
Training improves water adequacy 
Agricultural 
training 
AGRTR Determination of farmers who have received training in 
agriculture 
Dummy; 1 if farmer had training and 0 otherwise 




KGOVAIMS Measures farmers awareness of governments agenda for the SIS 
Likert; 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neutral 4= agree, 5= 
strongly agree 
Awareness of the governments agenda for SISs 





Allows determination of farmers in election participation 
Likert; 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neutral 4= agree, 5= 
strongly agree 




AVWALIC Determination of farmers who have water licenses 
Dummy; 1 if farmer cites yes and 0 otherwise 








measure farmer perception on water rights 
Dummy; 1 if farmer cites yes and 0 otherwise 
 







Variable Code Description Hypothesis 
Water conflicts 
between farmers 
WACONFLFRM Allows for the determination of conflicts at farm/village level 
Dummy; 1 yes and 0 otherwise 
Less conflicts improves water adequacy 
Water conflicts 
between blocks 
WATCONFLBLK Allows for the determination of conflicts at block level 
Dummy; 1 yes and 0 otherwise 
Less conflicts improves water adequacy 
Water fees WATFEES Determination of farmers that pay for water 
Dummy; 1 if farmer cites yes and 0 otherwise 
Farmers that pay water fees have access to 




SATIRRSCHDL Measures timeliness in water delivery 
Likert; 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neutral 4= agree, 5= 
strongly agree 
Farmers receiving water on time and irrigating 




ATTWTRLDTRA Determination of farmers who participate actively in water 
related training exercises 
Likert; 1= sometimes, 2= always, 0= otherwise 
Farmers who actively participate in such 





ATTIRRMTNGS Determination of farmers who participate actively in irrigation 
meetings 
Likert; 1= sometimes, 2= always, 0= otherwise 
Farmers who actively participate in such 
meetings are more likely to report water 
adequacy 
Table 5.2 Variables defining water adequacy status for the various farmers in the schemes and their respective coding as 





5.4.1 Variable selection 
 
For this study, 15 governance related factors were identified and run in the regression model. 
Location in block (BLCK) is a determinant factor when it comes to water access. Literature 
indicates that farmers located at upper reaches of the scheme have unlimited access to water and 
this subsequently impacts on adequacy (Bruns, 2007; Sharaunga & Mudhara, 2016). Another 
governance related factor Location of irrigation scheme within the district (LOC_DISTRICT) was 
identified as a contributor to water adequacy. The methods used to abstract, convey and apply 
water determines how successful scheme goals can be met. Literature suggests that farmers using 
advanced methods e.g. electric and diesel pumps, for water abstraction, conveyance and 
application are more likely to have adequate water to their plots. (Sinyolo et al., 2014). 
 
Water management training (WAMTR), irrigation training (IRRTR) and agricultural training 
(AGRTR) were also identified as probable factors that influence water adequacy in irrigation 
schemes. Water adequacy perception is centred on the farmers ability to utilise acquired skills. van 
Koppen et al. (2018) stated that investing in soft skills, i.e. farmer training, yields improved 
production which stems from improved water use efficiency and subsequently improved water 
adequacy. Allouche (2016) stated that farmers with knowledge about governments aim in SISs 
(KGOVAIMS) were most likely to have adequate water. Government designs policy and it is 
diffused and translated by the decentralised institutions (WUAs and IMCs) to the farmers. Farmers 
with a clear understanding of the policies and strategies are more likely inclined to effectively 
manage the water resource. 
 
Fair election process (FAIRELECTPRCSS), attending water related training and irrigation 
meetings (ATTWTRLDTRA and ATTIRRMTNGS), water conflicts amongst blocks and farmers 
(WATCONFLBLK and WACONFLFRM) respectively were identified as water governance 
related factors that could potentially influence water adequacy. A fair election process is a 
participatory approach that ensures all interest groups are properly represented, as such properly 
represented interest groups averts conflict. Studies have revealed that a participatory approach 
harmonises irrigation scheme dynamics, hence water equity, delivery and adequacy are met 




(AVWALIC) and water fees (WATFEES) were also identified as water governance related factors 
that potentially influenced water adequacy. Literature reveals that for a farmer to have “wet water” 
they have to make the necessary payment to acquire permits (“paper water”) (Denby et al., 2017). 
The variable available water rights (AVWATRGHT) was considered to be a potentially water 
adequacy influencing governance factor. Studies have shown that water rights contribute 
immensely to improved water access and subsequently crop production. Water rights allow 
farmers to protect their water from being stealthily taken away by other farmers which 
subsequently impacts on water adequacy (Bruns, 2007). Lastly, satisfaction with irrigation 
schedule (SATIRRSCHDL) was also deemed as influencing water adequacy. 
 
5.5 Data analysis 
 
The Binomial Logit (BNL) was applied to analyse the governance factors assumed to influence 
adequacy. The analysis was done using STATA 15 statistical software. According to Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld (1981), the Binary Logit model is defined as follows: 
 








      5.1 
where:  
  𝑃𝑖 is the probability of the farmer having high water adequacy, 
𝑌𝑖 is the observed variable for adequacy (i.e., 1= adequate and 0= not adequate), 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 are factors determining the water adequacy status for farmer 𝑖, and 𝑗 stand for     
parameters to be estimated. 
 
For ease of presentation Sharaunga & Mudhara (2016) substituted the variable 𝑒−(𝛼1+∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖)
𝑘
1  with 
𝑍 thus Equation 5.1 becomes: 






      5.2 
From Equation (5.1) the probability of a farmer citing water adequacy is given by (1 − 𝑃𝑖) which 




(1 − 𝑃𝑖) =
1
1+𝑒𝑍𝑖
        5.3 
 
The odds ratio for asserting water adequacy  
𝑃𝑖
(1−𝑃𝑖)







= 𝑒𝑍𝑖       5.4 
 




) = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑘=𝑛
𝑘=1        5.5 
 
Taking into consideration, the disturbance term 𝜀𝑖 the Binary Logit model (BNL) finally becomes: 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑘=𝑛
𝑘=1        5.6 
where: 
𝛼 = the fixed component of the log odds, 
𝛽𝑖 = explanatory (independent) variable(s), and 
𝜀𝑖 = error term. 
 
Similar empirical models have been applied in various water cases. Gomo et al. (2014) used the 
Probit model, which is in the same family with Logit generalized of linear models, to investigate 
farmer satisfaction with smallholder irrigation scheme performance. Sharaunga & Mudhara (2016) 
used the BNL model to investigate factors that influence water use security in smallholder 
irrigation farming. 
 
5.6 Results and Discussions 
 
5.6.1 Descriptive statistics for MRIS and TFIS 
 
The variable IRRWTADQCY was a dummy variable with 1 indicating water adequacy and 0 
otherwise (Table 5.3). Table 5.3 shows significant differences in water adequacy between some 




adequate compared to 23% in MRIS. A high proportion of farmers did not receive training in 
agriculture, irrigation and water management, which is contrary to expectation. Table 5.3 reveals 
that 54% of farmers who do not pay for water (PAYMNTWAT) are not water adequate. Some 
94% of farmers who were satisfied with the irrigation schedule (SATIRRSCHDL) were water 
adequate whilst all those who expressed dissatisfaction did not have water adequate. Farmers that 
did not experience water conflicts were more likely to be water adequate compared to their 
counterparts. Farmers’ participation in irrigation and water management training increased the 
chances of experiencing water adequacy. This was evident as 64% who participated in water 
related training and subsequently indicated water adequacy. Farmers’ who paid water fees indicate 
water adequacy. This is evident as 79% who paid water fees expressed water adequacy. On the 
contrary, 54% of those who did not pay water fees indicated water inadequacy. Farmer location 
across the canal reach was a significant factor. 65% of farmers at the head end indicated water 
adequacy, whereas 24% of those at the tail end indicated water adequacy. 58% of farmers’ who 
agreed to a fair election process within the scheme indicated water adequacy whilst 54% of water 
adequate farmers’ neither agreed nor disagreed. 
 
Table 5.3 Independent variables behaviour with respect to water adequacy 
  Water adequacy  






𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
BLCK Tail (𝑛 = 59) 76 24 0.000*** 
Head(𝑛 = 180)  35 65 
IRRG_SCHEME TFIS (𝑛 = 119) 13 87 0.000*** 
MRIS (𝑛 = 120) 77 23 
WAMTR Yes (𝑛 = 56) 43 57 0.689 
No (𝑛 = 183) 46 54 
IRRTR Yes (𝑛 = 56) 36 64 0.104 
No (𝑛 = 183) 48 52 
AGRTR Yes (𝑛 = 112) 43 57 0.496 
No (𝑛 = 127) 47 53 
 
KGOVAIMS 
Agree (𝑛 = 11) 36 64  




Disagree (𝑛 = 55) 47 53 
FAIRELECTPRCSS Agree (𝑛 = 101) 42 58  
0.091* Neutral (𝑛 = 28) 46 54 
Disagree (𝑛 = 5) 80 20 
 
AVWALIC 
Agree (𝑛 = 6) 50 50  
0.985 Neutral (𝑛 = 54) 46 54 
Disagree (𝑛 = 66) 47 53 
AVWATRGHT Yes (𝑛 = 111) 13 87  
0.954 Not sure (𝑛 = 38) 47 53 
No (𝑛 = 90) 12 88 
WACONFLFRM Yes (𝑛 = 61) 70 30  
0.000*** No (𝑛 = 177) 36 64 
WATCONFLBLK Yes (𝑛 = 43) 91 9 0.000*** 
No (𝑛 = 195) 35 65 
PAYMNTWAT Yes (𝑛 = 62) 21 79 0.000*** 
No (𝑛 = 177) 54 46 
SATIRRSCHDL Agree (𝑛 = 52) 6 94  
0.000*** Neutral (𝑛 = 19) 68 32 
Disagree(𝑛 = 28)  100 0 
 
ATTWTRLDTRA 
Always (𝑛 = 127) 39 61  
0.091* Sometimes (𝑛 =
62) 
53 47 
Never (𝑛 = 50) 52 48 
 
ATTIRRMTNGS 
Always (𝑛 = 167) 42 58  
0.300 Sometimes (𝑛 =
68) 
53 47 
Never (𝑛 = 4) 50 50 
Notes: ***, **, * means statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 





5.6.2 Binary logit analysis 
 
This section shows the results of the Binary Logit model (BNL) run using STATA 15. The BNL 
had two levels of responses based on water adequacy (IRRWTADQCY). A frequencies table was 
generated and it indicated that 28 irrigators in MRIS had adequate water and 92 had inadequate 
water. In TFIS 104 irrigators had adequate water and 16 had inadequate water. The data is 
summarised in Table 5.4 below. 
Table 5.4 Frequency table with respect to water adequacy for TFIS and MRIS 
Response TFIS MRIS 
 Frequency Percent (%) Frequency Percent (%) 
Yes 104 87 28 23 
No 16 13 92 77 
Total 120 100 120 100 
 
5.7 Regression Model Diagnostics 
 
The model results are presented in Table 5.5. Multi-collinearity diagnostics showed no significant 
correlation between the explanatory variables. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) averaged 
1.698 which is within the acceptable range of below 10 (Rogerson, 2001; Hounsome et al., 2006). 
The standard error estimates were low, i.e., below 10, which indicated that micro-numericity was 
not a problem. The model revealed an overall classification accuracy of 89.12%, which illustrates 
that it successfully predicted irrigation water adequacy. The Chi-square test was significant ( 𝑝 <
0.01) indicating a good predictive capacity of the model. The results show that irrigation scheme 
infrastructure characteristics (IRRG_SCHEME)  have a bearing on water adequacy (𝑝 = 0.001). 
In addition, other statistically significant variables are location of plot in scheme (BLCK) (𝑝 =
0.001), water management training (WAMTR) (𝑝 = 0.012), irrigation training (IRRTR) (𝑝 =
0.088), knowledge of government aims in the SISs (KGOVAIMS) (𝑝 = 0.026), availability of 
water license (AVWALIC) (𝑝 = 0.002), paying water fees (PAYMNTWAT) (𝑝 = 0.093), and 




Table 5.5 Estimates of the Binary Logit Model for TFIS and MRIS 
IRRWTADQCY Coef Std Err 𝑝 > |𝑧| Marginal Effects (𝑑𝑦/
𝑑𝑥) 
BLCK -2.383 0.656 0.001 -0.176 
IRRG_SCHEME -4.581*** 1.141 0.000 -0.338 
WAMTR 2.190** 0.874 0.012 0.162 
IRRTR -1.440* 0.843 0.088 -0.106 
AGRTR -0.634 0.634 0.317 -0.047 
KGOVAIMS 0.517** 0.232 0.026 0.038 
FAIRELECTPRCSS 0.204 0.269 0.447 0.015 
AVWALIC 0.799*** 0.252 0.002 0.059 
AVWATRGHT 0.309 0.532 0.561 0.023 
WATCONFLBLK -1.055 1.025 0.303 -0.052 
WATCONFLFRM -0.709 0.774 0.360 -0.078 
PAYMNTWAT -1.728** 1.028 0.093 -0.128 
SATIRRSCHDL 1.601*** 0.297 0.000 0.118 
ATTWTRLDTRA -0.296 0.404 0.465 -0.022 
ATTIRRMTNGS 0.795 0.551 0.149 0.059 
_cons -6.658 2.325 0.004 - 
***, **, * means statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Source: Survey data (2017). 
 
Irrigation scheme and farmer location in scheme 
 
The variable for location of farmer within the district (LOC_DISTRICT) was negative and 
statistically significantly influenced water adequacy (𝑝 = 0.000). This revealed that being located 
in MRIS is associated with an increase in probability of citing water inadequacy by 0.3. The 
farmers in TFIS are more likely to have adequate water than those in MRIS. The scheme 
infrastructure characteristics contribute to the positive attribute on TFIS. TFIS adopted an 
underground-piped water conveyance system, whereas MRIS has the canal system that needs 
Number of observation 239 
LR Chi-square (Prob > Chi-square) 214.52 (𝑝 = 0.000) 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.6518 




repair and is old. The upgraded technology in TFIS has minimal human interaction and 
interference, i.e., operability of the water control infrastructure, whilst Mooi River farmers use 
manually operated canal and gated systems that can be tampered with. Horst (1998) highlighted 
that a system that is user friendly and requires minimal human interaction during operation tends 
to serve the purpose better and offer farmers/irrigators a correct irrigation function. 
 
MRIS is characterized by many gated structures that are illegally accessed and easily vandalized. 
The variable (BLCK) which signifies the farmers’ location within the scheme statistically 
significantly had a bearing on water adequacy (𝑝 = 0.001). Farmers located at the tail end were 
approximately 18% more likely to indicate water inadequacy than those at the head. Sharaunga & 
Mudhara (2016) established that farmers at the tail-end in MRIS were water deficient. Gomo 
(2012) revealed that the average conveyance efficiency for the canal systems in MRIS was 40% 
instead of the design 85% for the concrete lined canals. This was attributed to leakages along the 
canals where maintenance was over-due. Illegal water abstractions (Figure 5.5), amplified by 
leaking canals and silt accumulation (Figure 5.6), are amongst the major factors that impact on 











Figure 5.5  A comparison of illegal water abstractions between MRIS and TFIS. 
 
Agree Neutral Disagree
MRIS 59.2 8.3 32.5






























According to Letsoalo & Van Averbeke (2006) poor infrastructural maintenance leads to weeds 
growing in canals so that when water carries the silt it enhances increases subsequently reducing 











Figure 5.6  (a) Silted canal and (b) cracks and failed concrete lining 
 
Water management training 
 
The variable for training in water management (WAMTR) was statistically significant (𝑝 =
0.012) suggesting that it influenced water adequacy. Training in water management is associated 
with an increase in probability of indicating water adequacy by 16%. Water management is defined 
as determining and controlling the rate, amount and timing of irrigation water in a planned and 
efficient manner. Farmers with knowledge in Crop Water Requirement (CWR) and the irrigation 
schedule were most likely to have adequate water for cropping requirements. Pereira et al. (2002) 
also argued that for water supplied on a demand-scheduled, farmers with knowledge in irrigation 
scheduling and CWR were more likely to be water efficient, which subsequently means they had 





educating farmers in adopting technologies increased their adaptive capacities, which improves 




The negative and statistically significant variable irrigation training (IRRTR)(𝑝 = 0.088) showed 
that its lack increased the probability of indicating water adequacy by 11%. This finding was not 
expected. The anticipated outcome was exposure to irrigation training would increase the 
probability of a farmer citing water adequacy. The finding resonates with the notion that farmers 
are comfortable with their inherited irrigation knowledge (Mehta et al., 2017). Furthermore, Mehta 
et al. (2017) point out the complexity of the African system of water resource management, as one 
that has a web of customary beliefs. 
 
Knowledge of government aims 
 
The variable for “farmers had knowledge of the government’s aims" (KGOVAIMS) was positively 
statistically significant (𝑝 = 0.026). Farmers who had knowledge of the government’s aims in 
SISs were likely to experience water adequacy, i.e., a knowledgeable farmer was more likely to 
increase the probability of water adequacy by 4%. Government as over-seer of the irrigation 
schemes, formulates policy and strategies that trickle down from basin scale to village level 
irrigation schemes, thus proper policy articulation and implementation of the strategies improve 
the handling of the water resource, which subsequently increases water adequacy. De-
centralisation, which saw the creation of WUAs and IMCs has been the driver for improved policy 
and information dissemination. Local institutions and organisations have promoted participation. 
The finding concurs with Denby et al. (2017) who argued that the 1998 National Water Act 
facilitated decentralising participatory institutions that articulate and reconcile the divergent goal 
between government and the farmers. In addition, Alba & Bolding (2016) also argued that the 
creation of local level institutions that articulate policy and implement government strategy allow 
policy movement through various channels where it gains more transformative perspective and 





Availability of water license 
 
The positive and statistically significant parameter estimate for possessing a water license 
(AVWALIC) means that farmers who possessed water licenses were more likely to experience 
water adequacy. The positive impact for possessing a water license increased the probability of 
citing water adequacy by 59%. Water permits allow equitable water appropriation. Denby et al. 
(2017) argued that in order to obtain “wet water” there has to be “paper water” first. In addition, 
Alba et al. (2016) argued that water licensing presented a robust accountability system that 
improve water allocation amongst users, where the underlying concept being that proper volumes 




The coefficient estimate for concurring to paying water fees (PAYMNTWAT) was negative and 
statistically significant (𝑝 = 0.093). The finding did not concur with the anticipated outcome. It 
is expected that farmers who pay water fees are more likely to indicate water adequacy since water 
payments secure water abstraction rights.  Access to water  can be blocked when no payments has 
been made. In addition, water payments facilitate infrastructure maintenance, which subsequently 
improves water conveyance, and water adequacy. The anticipated finding concurred with Gulati 
& Narayanan (2002) who argued that the absence of water payments hindered improved water 
service quality and such inefficiencies that negatively impact on water adequacy. 
 
Satisfaction with the irrigation schedule 
 
Irrigation scheduling is primarily related to technological and operational factors (Horst, 1998). 
The variable called satisfaction with irrigation scheduling (SATIRRSCHDL), was statistically 
significant (𝑝 = 0.001) and positively influenced water adequacy. According to Table 5.5 farmers 
who were content with the irrigation schedule were more likely to have adequate water for their 
operations. A farmer satisfied with the irrigation schedule increased the probability of indicating 
water adequacy by 0.12. This phenomenon may be attributable to effective information 




is flexible in supply, timing and rate. A flexible irrigation schedule facilitates easy agronomic 
planning and decision-making. Palmer et al. (1989) cites a flexible irrigation schedule promotes 





This study assessed the factors that influenced water adequacy in smallholder irrigation schemes 
in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Eight factors were statistically significant. In addition, poor 
infrastructure maintenance procedures in place have had a negative impact on the carrying capacity 
of the concrete lined canals. Investing in water management training improves access to water. In 
addition, conflicts impacted negatively on water adequacy for crop production. A flexible 
irrigation i.e., one designed to operate in a timely and accurate manner, empowers farmers to make 
informed agronomic and economic decisions. 
 
The study also assessed the implication of technology upgrade on water adequacy. TFIS farmers 
were more likely to be water adequate as compared to the MRIS farmers partly due to the scheme 
upgrade done in TFIS. TIFS moved from wholly canal systems to piped networks across the 
blocks. Through this, it was established that the human dimension, as effected by operability and 
canal structure handling, has a bearing on water adequacy. Flow sensitivity is common in canals , 
and due to lack of knowledge scheme managers and bailiffs are less likely to identify such point. 
This consequently leads to poor flow regimes and water inadequacy. 
 
Farmers who received water management training were highly likely to have adequate water to 
meet their cropping needs. Illegal abstractions were taxing compliant farmers. The rule breakers 
seem to reap the benefits of accessing water at any given time at the expense of the other farmers. 
Water conflicts between blocks were also another factor that negatively influenced water 
adequacy. Policy incoherence and lack of coordination amongst blocks were the primary cause for 
water conflicts. In addition, institutions showed poor capacity in rule enforcement and reining in 






It is recommended that the farmers properly organize themselves and re-align thoughts and 
attitudes towards the scheme infrastructure and be aware of the consequences of their actions to 
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6 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Background 
 
Scheme performance is influenced by water governance structures. IMT transferred scheme 
management from government agencies to Water User Associations (WUAs) and Irrigation 
Management Committees (IMCs). These WUA and IMCs are legal entities whose scope of 
responsibility varies across the scheme. The WUAs and IMCs are “supposedly” concerned and 
vested with the authority to among, other things, organize the operation and maintenance (O&M) 
of the scheme, conflict resolution and collecting water fees. The self-governance approach varies 
across the world with irrigation schemes in Asia reporting a success whilst those in Africa 
exhibited the opposite. Despite massive investment by the South Africa government in irrigation 
schemes performance has been low. Irrigation is a priority on the budget, the government is on 
record of spending ZAR40,000.00 per hectare in irrigation (Sinyolo et al., 2014). Scheme 
rehabilitation and revitalization has been recurrent however the level of performance exhibited by 
the irrigation schemes is not commensurate with invested funds. Canal irrigation management is 
besieged by poor institutional arrangements and poor and degraded water control infrastructure. 
 
The study sought to establish a link between water control infrastructure and the existing water 
governance frameworks in Mooi-River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS) and Tugela Ferry Irrigation 
Scheme (TFIS). Questionnaires were administered to key players and irrigators to capture their 
perceptions on the interactions of water governance and water control infrastructure. 
 
6.2 Findings and Conclusions 
 
6.2.1 Infrastructure condition 
 
Infrastructure in MRIS was badly dilapidated and was due for maintenance. The canals in the 
sampled blocks 5, 89, 11 and 15 were critically damaged needing immediate repair. Some 
components of the sluice gates had exceeded their service life. The regulators in blocks 9 and 11 




the components of the infrastructure were due maintenance. The infield watering hoses were 
critically damaged and needed immediate replacement. The hoses had cracks that caused a lot of 
leaks. The investigative study concluded that various components of infrastructure in both 
irrigation schemes (MRIS and TFIS) was in bad condition. A root cause analysis revealed that 
both stakeholders (extension workers and designers) converged on certain governance casual 
factors for infrastructure deterioration. The common causal factors were maintenance related, 
institutional related, people related and environmental related. The study concluded that the 
irrigation schemes lacked an O&M programme. In addition, infrastructure dilapidation was 
exacerbated by uncooperative irrigators, and the irrigators were unwilling to contribute financially 
towards the scheme. It was revealed that the schemes had non-existent WUAs and IMCs. The 
institutional causal factors was a result of poor policy articulation by extension workers which then 
trickles to the irrigators. The infrastructure needed maintenance to avoid water losses. 
 
6.2.2 Functional and operational relationships between water control infrastructure and 
water governance 
 
MRIS had poor institutional arrangements as compared to TFIS. However, MRIS had high 
compliance levels as compared to TFIS. MRIS had solid rule enforcement compared to TFIS. Both 
schemes exhibited similar characteristics under processes (defining scheme goals, stakeholder 
engagement just to mention a few) and procedures (collecting water fees and gate operations). It 
was concluded that MRIS improve its institutional arrangement whilst TFIs improved on its rule 
enforcement and compliance. It was concluded that both schemes needed to improve on their 
procedures when it comes to infrastructure handling and understanding its requirements and 
characteristics. It was also concluded that farmers were unaware of institutions that are supposed 
to foster participation and improve self-governance. 
 
6.2.3 Governance impacts on water adequacy 
 
The governance factors which were significant in impacting on water adequacy were five 
variables; irrigation scheme, location of plot within the scheme, training in water management, 




irrigators that had water management training were more likely to cite water adequacy. The study 
concluded that farmers at the top end were always water adequate and this created an “artificial” 
water inadequacy for downstream users. A continuous supply of water for the upstream users 
disrupted the irrigation schedule and created erratic delivery disruption for the downstream users, 




It is recommended that findings from this study be implemented for improved water management 
in TFIS and MRIS. Routine canal inspections and financial contributions towards the scheme are 
essential. Transaction costs associated with O&M are too large a cost for the local irrigators’ since 
the inhabitants are in previously poverty nodes or homelands, hence external stakeholder 
intervention is required for financial assistance. Farmers are encouraged to report unlawful 
behavior and desist from vandalism. This will preserve the integrity of the infrastructure thus 
reducing water losses. Training in water management is warranted, as this will improve crop 
production and water security for other domestic uses. 
 
6.4 Future Research Needs 
 
Extending the diagnosis to other irrigation schemes in South Africa will aid in designing a decision 
support tool for stakeholders involved in sharing and managing common pool resources. Artificial 
intelligence can be incorporated in the fuzzy theory to design a physical and socioeconomic model 
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Integrated decision matrix for Mooi-River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS) 
 
Aspect 𝑃𝑖 Aspect weight 𝑃𝑖 Criteria 𝑃𝑖𝑗 Criteria weight 𝑃𝑖𝑗 𝑃𝑖𝑗  𝑤. 𝑟. 𝑡. 𝑃𝑖 






0.25, 0.25, 0.34 
Sensitivity of 
conveyance 
0.38, 0.42, 0.42 0.11, 0.11, 0.13 
Sensitivity of delivery 0.35, 0.37, 0.40 0.09, 0.10, 0.12 
Sensitivity to setting 0.20, 0.21, 0.22 0.05, 0.06, 0.07 






0.31, 0.41, 0.42 
Correct irrigation function 0.28, 0.29, 0.32 0.10, 0.12, 0.12 
Uncommon occurrence  0.11, 0.11, 0.18 0.05, 0.05, 0.06 
Effective info 0.22, 0.30, 0.30 0.07, 0.12, 0.13 
Uniform flow rate 0.32, 0.32, 0.38 0.12, 0.13, 0.13 
     
 
Responsiveness 
0.33, 0.35, 0.35 Problem dealing 
mechanism 
0.50, 0.70, 0.71 0.18, 0.23, 0.25 
 Response to farmers 
complaints 





Integrated decision matrix for Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme (TFIS) 
Aspect 𝑃𝑖 Aspect weight 𝑃𝑖 Criteria 𝑃𝑖𝑗 Criteria weight 𝑃𝑖𝑗 𝑃𝑖𝑗  𝑤. 𝑟. 𝑡. 𝑃𝑖 






0.15, 0.15, 0.24 
Sensitivity of conveyance 0.35, 0.40, 0.42 0.05, 0.06, 0.06 
Sensitivity of delivery 0.26, 0.32, 0.32 0.03, 0.05, 0.08 
Sensitivity to setting 0.15, 0.17, 0.25  0.02, 0.03, 0.06 






0.37, 0.37, 0.39 
 
Correct irrigation function 0.19, 0.19, 0.24 0.07, 0.07, 0.09 
Uncommon occurrence  0.15, 0.15, 0.20 0.05, 0.06, 0.08 
Effective info 0.18, 0.18, 0.21 0.07, 0.07, 0.08 
Uniform flow rate 0.22, 0.26, 0.27 0.08, 0.10, 0.10 




0.23, 0.32, 0.37 
 
Problem dealing mechanism 0.00, 0.23, 0.25 0.00, 0.07, 0.09 
 Response to farmers complaints 0.00, 0.55, 0.56 0.00, 0.18, 0.21 
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